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Abstract
Does policing the police increase crime? We avoid simultaneity effects of
increased public oversight during a major scandal by identifying events in
Chicago that only impacted officers’ self-imposed monitoring. We estimate
crime’s response to self- and public-monitoring using regression discontinu-
ity and generalized synthetic control methods. Self-monitoring, triggered by
police union memos, significantly reduced serious complaints without impact-
ing crime or effort. However, after a scandal, both civilian complaints and
crime rates rise, suggesting that higher crime rates following heightened over-
sight results from de-policing and civilian behavior simultaneously changing.
Our research suggests that proactive internal accountability improves police-
community relations without increasing crime.
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1 Introduction
Misconduct scandals have rocked multiple fields, including finance, entertainment, academia,
medicine, and, most notably, policing.1 Opponents of increased oversight have claimed
that any form of increased monitoring may do more harm than good by decreasing pro-
ductivity. This discussion has been particularly relevant in policing: theories of “de-
policing” (MacDonald [2019], Owens [2019]) or the “Ferguson effect” (Mac Donald [2016])
propose that increased oversight will drive officers to reduce effort, resulting in higher
crime rates. Yet, empirical evidence supporting such theories are often dependent on pub-
lic scandals to induce shocks to oversight (Prendergast [2001], Shi [2009], Heaton [2010],
Cassell [2018]). This paper provides new evidence on the effect of oversight on crime and
police effort in a scandal-free environment.
To evaluate the effect of oversight on officer conduct, effort, and crime, we use de-
tailed misconduct and crime data from the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) from 2007 to 2016. We
distinguish between two types of oversight: self-monitoring by officers results from an
increase in their perceived cost of receiving misconduct accusations; public-monitoring
by civilians results from an increase in their perceived benefit of alleging misconduct. By
identifying events that solely increase self-monitoring, we are able to isolate the effect of
oversight on our outcomes of interest and avoid the simultaneity bias that accompanies
increased public monitoring during scandals. We find that an increase in self-monitoring
significantly reduces allegations of constitutional violations, but it does not reduce officer
effectiveness, as neither arrests nor crime are affected.
We contrast the self-monitoring results with estimates of the effect of a major polic-
ing scandal in Chicago on misconduct, crime, and effort. We find evidence confirming
“de-policing” during scandal periods, as rates of murder and robbery increase without
corresponding increases in arrest rates. Since major scandals are characteristically highly
public and impact civilian opinion, values, and incentives regarding law enforcement,
such scandals simultaneously affect both civilian and officer behavior. Incentives for civil-
1For example, see finance (Keefe [2014], Stevenson and Goldstein [2016]), entertainment (Moniuszko
[2017], Kantor and Twohey [2019]), medicine (Rabin [2015]), academia (Binder et al. [2016], Thompson and
Clark [2019]).
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ians to commit crime increase due to civil disorder, mistrust of officers, and decreased
civilian cooperation, holding constant officer effort and enforcement. We term this “si-
multaneity bias”, and we provide evidence consistent with its existence: in the aftermath
of a scandal, civilian complaints, from both victims (filing service focused complaints)2
and suspects (filing complaints alleging constitutional violations) of crime, significantly
increase despite officers simultaneously decreasing enforcement.
Using scandals3 as sources of exogenous variation is intuitive due to the noticeable
and direct effects they have on their population of interest. However, by their nature,
scandals temporarily and drastically change the incentives of both the principal (an of-
ficer suspected of misconduct) and agent (a civilian alleging misconduct), engendering
a simultaneity bias in estimates of the effect of increased oversight, decreased trust, and
heightened sensitivity and dissatisfaction with the police and institutions on outcomes of
interest (Lee and Suen [Forthcoming]). To isolate the impact of oversight alone, it is nec-
essary to identify events which solely impact officers’ incentives, as oversight agencies
generally do not rely on heightened vigilance from all civilians.
To provide new evidence on the impact of oversight on misconduct, crime, and arrests,
we rely on the assumption that our first two events only impacted officers and increased
their self-monitoring. These events are articles in the monthly newsletter published by
the city’s police union whose sole audience is Chicago police officers. The first article,
the “FOP Note”, was published in 2009, and it notified officers of the risks of receiving
complaints.4 The second article, the “Kalven Note”, was published in 2014, and it notified
officers that complaints filed against them would be made public in the future. In contrast,
the third event is the scandal that erupted in late 2015 following the public release of
footage of the officer-involved-shooting (OIS) of Laquan McDonald. The articles have
the advantage of being published in a periodical only read by officers, in a period free
of major scandals involving the CPD, and, in the case of the first event, before the public
2Throughout this paper, we use the terms “failure to provide service,” or “service focused,” complaints
involving individuals who sought help from the police. We also use the terms “constitutional violations,”
or “serious,” complaints involving individuals engaged by the police on suspicion of criminal activity.
3For example, highly publicized cases of police brutality, corruption, discrimination, or sexual harass-
ment.
4Unlike Mac Donald [2016], this event occurred in a period free of major scandal and pre-national debate
on reforming the police.
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debate about police accountability erupted across the United States (see Fig. 2). Our
design isolates the effect of self-imposed monitoring by police officers from the impact of
changes in oversight following a period of public scrutiny.
We take advantage of Chicago micro-level data to capture crime and officers’ behav-
ioral responses to oversight. Similar to Anderson [2014], we estimate the impact of over-
sight on complaints, crimes, and arrests using a regression discontinuity design (RD). We
find that the number of complaints decreases after the release of the notes but increases
after the OIS Scandal. The abrupt change in the number of constitutional violation com-
plaints after each event suggests that officers altered their behavior with suspects. More
precisely, we find that the increase in self-monitoring decreases those complaints by 22-
35% (p<0.01) relative to the baseline; in contrast, after the scandal, complaints increase by
more than 61% (p<0.01). We do not find evidence that the other types of complaints are
affected by the change in self-monitoring, suggesting that officers did not adjust their be-
havior when interacting with non-suspects or colleagues (workplace complaints). How-
ever, both service-related and constitutional violation complaints significantly increase
when there is an increase in public monitoring triggered by the scandal. The simultaneity
bias associated with the scandal makes it difficult to identify how the different types of
oversight impact officers’ conduct.
The analysis indicates that there was no discontinuous change in crime rates around
the increase in self-monitoring. In combination with the finding that the notes decreased
constitutional violations, this suggests that officers improved their treatment of suspects
without impacting public safety. On the other hand, there is a sharp increase in crime
around the OIS Scandal. The total number of crimes in each beat increased by 0.64 per
10,000 residents (5.4% relative to baseline mean).
Following Mas [2006], we use arrests as a measure of officer effort. The first note sent
by the union increased non-property crime-related arrests when using a local linear RD,
but the results are neither statistically nor economically significant. We find no evidence
that officers changed their arrest patterns when the Kalven Note was released. From these
findings, we conclude that self-monitoring did not induce officers to decrease effort. In
contrast, the OIS Scandal does alter arrest patterns, as crime increased with no corre-
sponding change in arrests; however, as argued previously, it is difficult to interpret this
4
result due to the simultaneity bias.
Finally, using generalized synthetic control methods (GSC) from Xu [2017], we evalu-
ate the effect of these events on crime rates in Chicago relative to other major U.S. cities.
In the spirit of the synthetic control method from Abadie and Gardeazabal [2003], Abadie
et al. [2010, 2015], this approach combines the interactive fixed effect models from Bai
[2009] with a cross-validation method to build a counterfactual for Chicago. This coun-
terfactual Chicago is constructed from the police departments of other major U.S. cities.
In our preferred specification, the control group includes only cities with at least 500,000
residents that were never subject to a Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation5, i.e. sub-
ject to public monitoring.
Using GSC, we do not find evidence that crime increases when self-monitoring in-
creases. We do find evidence that rates of property crime, murder, and robbery increase
significantly after the scandal. Our preferred specification indicates that the OIS Scandal
is associated with 18.4 additional murders in Chicago per month (p<0.01) in the year fol-
lowing the scandal. For comparison, self-monitoring is associated with fewer than two
extra murders per month, but this is not statistically significant from zero.
Our analysis that compares Chicago to other U.S. cities is robust to multiple specifica-
tions. Using the synthetic control method from Abadie et al. [2010, 2015], we find similar
results to the GSC method. Our results are also robust to the inclusion of cities with
smaller populations (population of at least 250,000) or subject to a DOJ investigation.
Lee and Suen [Forthcoming] provide theoretical explanations of the mechanisms be-
hind our empirical findings during a scandal. We find evidence that alleged victims are
strategic in reporting misconduct.6 Our findings suggests that civilian behavior toward
the police is not exogenous during volatile periods: in periods of high scrutiny of the po-
lice, the number of complaints against the police increases significantly, despite evidence
of less aggressive enforcement. These simultaneous responses to the scandal from both
civilians and officers make it difficult to draw causal conclusions on oversight’s impact
5Investigation of police departments from the DOJ are often triggered by scandals. Therefore we view
the DOJ as part of public-monitoring.
6Post-scandal, victims recognize that the police department is more likely to respond to police com-
plaints and that they have the support from various groups (ACLU, DOJ, etc.), so are more willing to come
forward.
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on crime using scandals.
Moreover, Pei and Strulovici [2019] provide theoretical explanations of the mecha-
nisms behind civilian and officer behavior. Applying their findings to police officers, the
authors show that when a principal (police) is accused of multiple instances (types) of
misconduct, which would possibly result in a large punishment, her decisions to commit
misconduct against different types of agents (civilians) are substitutes. Additionally, they
show that agents that have been separately victimized report in complementary fashion.
We show that an increase in police self-monitoring results in a decrease in complaints
mostly from suspects of crimes while service related complaints increase marginally. This
suggests that police officers may strategically abuse only one type of complainant at the
margin and that different targets of bad behavior are substitutes. Additionally, after the
scandal, both suspects and victims of crime increased their number of complaints; this
suggests complementary responses of different agents to an increase in public scrutiny
specifically regarding excessive use of force.
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature: (1) the deterrent effect of
police on crime, (2) the impact of police oversight on crime, and (3) the objective function
of police.
The deterrent effect of police on crime Since Levitt [1997], researchers have found ev-
idence suggesting crime responds to police staffing levels (Evans and Owens [2007], Fu
and Wolpin [2017], Chalfin and McCrary [2018], Mello [2019]), deployment and tactics
(Di Tella and Schargrodsky [2004], Draca et al. [2011], Klick and Tabarrok [2005]7), and
problem-oriented policing (Miller and Segal [2018], Owens et al. [2018]).
However, as argued in Becker and Stigler [1974], there is no reason to assume that
officers never engage in malfeasance while enforcing the law. Hence, officer misconduct
could impact multiple dimensions of policing: suspensions or re-assignments may reduce
manpower; deployment and tactics may be misused due to overly aggressive policing
or racial profiling; or the efficacy of problem-oriented policing may be diminished by
damaged community relations. Our paper contributes to this literature by measuring the
7Also see Blanes i Vidal and Kirchmaier [2017], Heaton, Hunt, MacDonald, and Saunders [2016], Chalfin
and McCrary [2018], Weisburd [2018], i Vidal and Mastrobuoni [2018]
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impact of changes in different forms of oversight on relevant outcomes such as crime,
arrests, and misconduct allegations.
The impact of police oversight on crime A series of articles estimating the effect of
oversight on officer conduct have used scandals in quasi-experimental designs that gen-
erated increased media attention and judicial scrutiny; they find increasing oversight
decreases police effort and increases crime rates (Prendergast [2001], Shi [2009], Heaton
[2010]).
We argue that one cannot interpret such estimates as the effect of oversight on polic-
ing because scandals induce simultaneous and significant changes in civilian incentives
which impact crime rates. This is informed by empirical and theoretical evidence. For
example, Desmond et al. [2016] documents that high-profile cases of police violence re-
sult in citizens being less likely to report crimes, and this can increase crime opportunities
independent of police effort. Furthermore, Persico [2002] suggests that unfair policing of
a population will encourage crime and provides theoretical conditions under which more
equitable policing would actually decrease crime.
We extend this literature in two ways: we find further evidence that scandals increase
crime, and we provide evidence that civilian and officer incentives simultaneously change
during a scandal. After the OIS Scandal, complaints about both officer conduct and con-
stitutional violations as well as murders and robberies increase significantly, despite ar-
rest rates remaining unchanged. In contrast, we find that events which only increase
self-monitoring significantly decrease complaints of constitutional violations and have
no impact on crime rates or arrests.
A related literature shows that officers are highly responsive to managerial directives
(Mas [2006]). In particular, studies found that more internal monitoring leads to higher hit
rates for stop-and-frisk in New York (Mummolo [2018]) and fewer violent crimes in New
Orleans (Cheng and Long [2018]). Our results support these findings, as we find police
union directives that increased self-monitoring among police officers strongly impacted
officer conduct, resulting in fewer allegations of constitutional violations and no increase
in crime or decrease in arrests.
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The objective function of police Our paper contributes to the economic literature on
the objective function of police officers–a subject that is highly relevant for policymakers.
As argued by Manski [2006], social planners only have partial knowledge of how policies
affect populations. Furthermore, there is ample theoretical literature on the cost of en-
forcement against innocent individuals (e.g. false arrests or failures to provide service) by
Donohue and Levitt [2001], Persico [2002], Manski and Nagin [2017], which contributes
to understanding how officers may engage in misconduct as they enforce the law (Becker
and Stigler [1974], Benoit and Dubra [2004]). However, there is little empirical evidence
on how officer misconduct impacts crime, and most of the literature on the costs and ben-
efits of proactive policing has focused on racial differences (Persico [2002], Durlauf [2006],
Manski [2005, 2006]).8
In this vein, we provide two main contributions. First, we find that an increase in
self-monitoring reduces misconduct without impacting the level of crime, while scandals
have a detrimental impact on the level of violence. Our results on public-monitoring are
in line with the theoretical results of Prat [2005]: an agent (officer) who knows that his
action is observed by the principal (public) has an incentive to behave in a conformist
manner thus permitting more crime, which can hurt the principal (public)– this is also in
line with theories of “de-policing.”
Secondly, we show that an increase in self-monitoring results in a reduction of alle-
gations of constitutional violations, which are primarily filed by criminal suspects rather
than by victims of crime. This result complements the findings of Ba [2018] who shows
that a policy that would reduce the cost of filing a complaint would mainly impact crime
victims, rather than suspects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background infor-
mation on police oversight in Chicago. Section 3 presents the effect of oversight on the
number of complaints filed against officers, crime, and arrest using micro-level data in
Chicago. Section 4 discusses the effect of oversight on crime comparing Chicago to other
8There is a large literature providing compelling empirical research designs to test for the presence of
racial bias in motor vehicle stops and searches (Knowles et al. [2001], Anwar and Fang [2006], Antonovics
and Knight [2009]). However, those designs do “not allow for the possibility of false accusation by police
or planting of evidence” (See footnote 5 in Knowles et al. [2001]). Dharmapala and Miceli [2012] provide
legal and theoretical explanations of officer incentives to make searches, seizures, and false arrests.
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major U.S. cities. Section 5 explores the robustness of our results. Section 6 provides a dis-
cussion on the potential policy implications and channels that explain our results. Section
7 concludes.
2 Background
The past ten years have witnessed significant fluctuations in police oversight in Chicago.
Figure 1 documents these fluctuations, where we take civilian complaints to be our main
metric of oversight between January 2007 and May 2016. This figure presents the total
number of monthly allegations of misconduct against Chicago police officers from Jan-
uary 2007 to May 2016. 9
We divide Figure 1 into four periods, segmented by the three previously identified
events. From January 2007 to October 2009, the average number of complaints is around
541 per month. The second period, November 2009 to July 2014, has an average of 361
complaints per month; this corresponds to decline of 34% relative to the first period. The
third period, August 2014 to October 2015, has an average of 169 complaints per month,
which corresponds to decline of 53% relative to the second period. Finally, the last period
constitutes the months after October 2015. During this period, the average number of
complaints is 96 per month, which corresponds to a 43% decline relative to the previous
period.
The dashed lines represent the three events we identify as varying the level and type
of monitoring. During our period of interest, public perception and focus on policing
changed significantly. To contextualize these events, we include frequencies of topics
and phrases used in articles between 2007 and 2018 from the Chicago Tribune, the city’s
largest newspaper, relating to the Chicago Police Department10. The articles were coded
to mentions of relevant topics (left figure) and monitoring agencies (right figure)11 in
9While weekly data is available, the events cannot be isolated to singular days for two reasons: informa-
tion transmission about the events may take more than a week, and the events themselves involved smaller
and related events around the month of the main event.
10The initial sample of Chicago Tribune articles was the first 8,000 articles available after performing a
search on chicagotribune.com/search/ for “Chicago Police Department”.
11i.e. agencies that impact the level of oversight, namely police union and the US department of Justice
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Figure 2.
The first event, the FOP Note, occurred in November 2009. The second vice-president
of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP)—a member of the Lodge’s Board of Directors—published
an article in the union’s monthly newsletter12 warning officers of the severity and poten-
tial risks of being named a witness officer in a complaint investigation (See Figure A.1 in
section B). Furthermore, this article appeared right after an unexpected and unfavorable
ruling in Bond v. Chicago, occurring in early November 2009, which made clear to the
union that officer complaint records would be the focus of further lawsuits.
This period is ideal as it occurred before the current debate on police accountability
and misconduct. Directly following the Bond v. Chicago ruling and the note, there was no
change in media coverage of the police department. As illustrated in Figure 2, most of the
articles involving the CPD during this period were related to violence in the city, while
topics related to policing accountability, misconduct, the DOJ, or the police union were
negligible and only appeared with any frequency years later.
The second event, the Kalven Note, was in response to the ruling in Kalven v. Chicago
(2014). The FOP President published a front-page report in the August 2014 edition of the
monthly newsletter informing officers that their complaint records would immediately
become available to the public (See Figure A.2 in section B). Again, we see no change in
Chicago Tribune coverage of the CPD with reference to police accountability, the DOJ, or
the police union. However, there is a transitory and relatively small increase in coverage
of police misconduct– this may be due to the well-publicized police shooting in Ferguson,
Missouri in the same month, which generated a significant amount of nationwide scrutiny
of police behavior13. If the event in Ferguson impacted Chicago, any effect of the Kalven
Note would be attenuated. Since the union newsletter is local and the notes are only
relevant to Chicago police officers, spillovers to other police departments in the country
are unlikely.
12The monthly newsletter contains various announcements, articles of interest for officers, and memos
from the union to officers on topics including police related current events, pensions, union bargaining,
funerals, and court cases.
13The Newsletter from September 2014 contains an article written by an FOP member where he shared his
opinion on the event in Ferguson and its implication on policing, political leadership, and media coverage.
Aside from this article, we were not able to find any official statement discussing the event in Ferguson in
the FOP newsletter.
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The third event, the OIS Scandal, is the public release of the dash-cam footage of the
killing of teenager Laquan McDonald by a CPD officer. The footage, released in Novem-
ber 201514, immediately brought national attention (Davey and Smith [2015]) and scrutiny
onto the department (See Figure A.3 in section B). The scandal ultimately triggered a civil
rights investigation by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and resulted in the implementa-
tion of multiple reforms to the Chicago Police Department and its oversight system by
consent decree15. Figure 2 indicates that the scandal coincides with a spike in the num-
ber of articles related to the CPD. Topics related to violence, police accountability, and
police misconduct all substantially increased during the month of the shooting leading
to a level-increase in all topics in the following months. Moreover, the number of articles
mentioning the DOJ or the police union also spiked during this month.
The difference in public scrutiny surrounding these events is significant. Following
both the FOP Note and the Kalven Note, news stories related to police accountability
and/or the notes themselves were not significant. As such, we believe these events can
only induce an increase in self-monitoring among police officers. In contrast, public at-
tention toward police accountability and misconduct spiked following the OIS Scandal.
Police self-monitoring increased (likely to avoid further scandal), but there was a simul-
taneous increase in public-monitoring triggered by the salient example of police miscon-
duct presented in the OIS itself, as well as in the subsequent DOJ Investigation. We exploit
this significant difference in order to isolate the effect of oversight.
3 Chicago level analysis
We start our analysis by exploiting micro-level data from Chicago to study the impact of
the different types of oversight on crime, officer conduct, and officer effort. The empirical
strategy relies on a time series RD (Auffhammer and Kellogg [2011], Anderson [2014])
and captures the effect of oversight in a window around each event of interest.
14The shooting occurred in October 2014 but drew no media attention until the footage was released.
15Donohue [2017] provides a detailed discussion of this incident and its implication on policing.
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3.1 Data and sample selection
Complaints data
The dataset of misconduct complaints was obtained via Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests as part of Kalven v. the City of Chicago & the Chicago Police Department (Kal-
ven v. Chicago). This data contains the universe of misconduct allegations filed against
CPD officers. Each complaint corresponds to a unique complaint registry number, which
represents a single incident involving any number of officers. Complainants can initiate
their complaint by phone, in person at the oversight agency’s location, by mail, with any
CPD supervisor at any district station, or over the internet. Moreover, officers can file a
complaint against other officers (See Ba [2018] for more details).
One of the main advantages of the data obtained through Kalven v. Chicago is that
complaints are categorized by the type of alleged misconduct.We categorize misconduct
complaints into four categories (in order of severity): Serious (constitutional violations);
Failure to Provide Service (FPS); Other; and Unknown. As a single incident may involve
multiple individual allegations, a complaint is identified by its highest level of severity,
whether or not any officer was identified in the complaint, and whether or not there
was a verdict (finding) on the allegation. Serious complaints are composed of allegations
against a known officer involving improper use of force, search, arrest or lock up, or
verbal abuse. Allegations in this category tend to be filed by an individual suspected by
the police of criminal activity. FPS complaints against a known officer involve a failure to
provide service or conduct unbecoming of an officer. FPS allegations tend to be filed by
potential victims of a crime or people seeking help from the police16. “Other” complaints
are allegations with a non-missing finding and a known officer where the complaint does
not fall into either the Serious or FPS category. “Other” categories of misconduct may
include misfiling reports, owing money to the city, operational personnel violations, or
workplace complaints. For “Unknown” complaints, all allegations associated with the
complaint either have missing findings or no identified officers.




The crime data reflects reported incidents that occurred in Chicago from 2001 to the
present. Each incident contains information about the crime, such as location, date, type,
and whether or not an arrest was made. For each police beat, we compute the monthly
number of total incidents and arrests for index crimes (violent and property crimes) and
other crimes (i.e. less serious offenses).
Sample selection
We merge complaints and crime data with demographic information from the 2010 Cen-
sus. We aggregate the outcomes of interest by beat and month. All the events in the
analysis are geocoded according to map A.4 to make events spatially comparable across
time, as some police beats changed during 2012. We do not include beats that are located
outside of Chicago. Beats that do not have any residents, according to the 2010 Census
data, are removed from the sample. The resulting sample contains a total of 276 beats.
For each event, we have 34 pre-intervention periods and six post-intervention periods. In
other words, the maximum number of periods such that each event can be observed with
the same number of pre- and post- periods is 40 months.
As suggested in Hausman and Rapson [2018], we account for seasonality in the out-
comes of interests. In other word, the variable ybt corresponds to the residuals that come
from regressing the outcome on month dummies and quadratic functions of temperature
and precipitation as well as beat fixed-effects.
3.2 Empirical strategy
We estimate how the events impacted complaints, crimes, and arrests using a regression
discontinuity design where time is the running variable (Auffhammer and Kellogg [2011],
Anderson [2014]). Specifically, for each outcome y in beat b during month-year t, we
estimate the following local linear regression
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ybt = b · Monitoringbt + f (datebt) + ab + #bt (1)
where ybt is the outcome per 10,000 residents. Because of the presence of zeros in
the data, we chose to analyze per 10,000 capita levels, rather than percentage changes or
logs. The beat fixed effects are given ab. The variable of interest, Monitoringbt, equals one
during or after the month of the event, and zero otherwise. Depending on the specifica-
tion of interest, Monitoringbt corresponds to the FOP Note, Kalven Note, or OIS Scandal.
The function f (datebt) is a flexible function of the date as the number of months from the
event of interest (centered at zero). As recommended by Gelman and Imbens [2019] we
use local linear and quadratic polynomials function for f (datebt).17
Identification of our parameter of interest, b, comes from assuming that after control-
ling for f (datebt) and ab, the error term, ebt, is exogenous. In other words, the change in
the outcomes was only caused by the discontinuous change in the level of monitoring,
i.e. b at datebt = 0, after controlling for time trends and beat fixed-effects. The key as-
sumption necessary to attribute any immediate change in the outcomes at the moment
of the event of interest is that no unobserved factor which affects the outcome also sys-
tematically changed at the same point in time. We specify a uniform kernel (Imbens and
Lemieux [2008]).18 To make all events comparable, the bandwidth is chosen based on
data availability and to maintain the same number of pre- and post-months around the
event of interest, which is 34 and 6 months of data in the pre- and post-periods.
The error term #bt is assumed to have non-constant variance, and standard errors are
clustered at the beat level. This assumption allows to account for correlation over time
and across beats (Cameron et al. [2011]). We follow Calonico et al. [2014, 2017] to obtain
our local polynomial estimators and standard errors.
17The authors argue that higher-order polynomials in RD design leads to imprecise estimates, poor cov-
erage of confidence intervals, and sensitivity to the degree of the polynomial.
18We find qualitatively similar estimates using a triangular kernel
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3.3 Results
Tables 1, 2, and 3 present the responses of complaints, crimes, and arrests to monitoring,
respectively. In each table, Panel A, B, and C report the impact of the FOP Note, Kal-
ven Note, and the OIS Scandal on the outcome of interest, respectively. Odd-numbered
columns consider a local linear polynomial function for f (datebt), while even-numbered
columns consider a quadratic polynomial function. As a companion to the tables, we also
provide graphical evidence of our results in Figures 3-11. These figures indicate that the
quadratic polynomial function fits the data better.
FOP and Kalven Notes
Panels A and B of Tables 1-3 capture how an increase in self-monitoring impacted police
conduct, the crime level, and police effort. Overall, Table 1 indicates that the number
of complaints decreases after the notes. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for total
complaint rates. The linear specification suggests total complaints dropped by 0.022-0.027
per 10,000 (p<0.05) after the release of the notes (mean at baseline is 0.26 for the FOP Note
and 0.20 for the Kalven Note). However, under the quadratic specification, the number
of total complaints were not significantly impacted by the Kalven and FOP Notes.
Figures 3 and 4 confirm the abrupt decrease, but the point estimates are within the
90% confidence interval. However, given the wide-ranging forms of misconduct and af-
fected populations types (suspects, victims of crime, or other officers, etc.), pooling all
complaints is not informative of changes in policing behavior. In fact, grouping disparate
complaint categories may obscure the impact of such events on specific policing behav-
iors.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4 indicate that Serious complaints
significantly decrease in response to increased self-monitoring. After the FOP Note, the
number of Serious complaints by beat dropped by 0.010-0.022 per 10,000 residents (p<0.01),
which represents a decrease relative to the baseline mean of at least 11%. After the Kalven
Note, Serious allegations per beat dropped by 0.015 to 0.022 per 10,000 residents (p<0.01),
which represents a 35% decrease relative to the baseline mean in our preferred specifica-
tion.
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Panel A of Table 1 indicates that the local linear regression suggests that the FOP Note
did not impact FPS complaints, while the number of complaints increased by 0.009 per
10,000 residents (p<0.1) under the quadratic specification. The number of FPS allegations
declined after the Kalven Note, but the results are not statistically significant.
Columns (7)-(10) of Table 1 show that the notes did not have any significant impact on
Other complaints. The null result for Other complaints supports the hypothesis that these
events impacted officer conduct with civilians and did not impact the internal workings of
the CPD or officers’ workplace conduct. Figure 3 and 4 confirm there is no discontinuous
change in the number of Other complaints around the time of the event.
Panels A and B of Table 2 present the impact of the notes on crime rates by category:
all, violent, property, and other types of crime. The RD results for the notes produced
economically small and not statistically significant increases in all types of crime (all in-
creases are less than 5.4% relative to baseline). Figures 6and 7 confirm that there is no
discontinuous change in the number of crimes before and after the release of the notes.
These results suggest that the increase in self-monitoring, and the subsequent decrease in
serious complaints, did not yield an increase in crime.
Finally, Panels A and B of Table 3 show the impact of the notes on arrests, our proxy
for officers’ effort. The arrest types correspond to the crime types: all, violent, property,
and other. The FOP Note appears to increase all and other arrests (p<0.01 and p<0.01,
respectively) under the linear specification, but under the quadratic specification it has a
small and insignificant negative effect. Similarly, under the FOP Note, the linear specifica-
tion finds an increase in violent arrests (p<0.01), while the quadratic specification shows
a positive but insignificant effect. Property arrests are not significantly impacted by the
FOP Note, though both specifications show modest positive effects. Though these results
are not robust, they certainly provide evidence against the proposition that an increase in
self-monitoring leads to a decrease in police effort as measured by arrests.
The Kalven Note, by comparison, caused no significant changes to any arrest type. All
specifications and crime types produced insignificant, small, and negative results, with
the exception of property crime under the quadratic specification with a minuscule pos-
itive coefficient (see Fig.10). These relatively precise and consistent null effects indicate
that arrest patterns were not impacted by the release of the Kalven Note, despite a notable
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decrease in Serious complaints.
OIS Scandal
We compare the results above with the impact of the OIS Scandal on misconduct, crime
levels, and officer effort. Panel C of Table 1 and Figure 8 indicate that, after the OIS Scan-
dal, allegations of misconduct discontinuously increased for all types of complaints, ex-
cept Other complaints. The total number of complaints sharply increased by about 0.054
per 10,000 residents (p<0.01), which represents a 36.7% increase relative to the baseline
mean.
Columns (3) and (4) suggest that the OIS Scandal increased the number of Serious
complaints by 50%, with an increase of 0.027 per 10,000 residents (p<0.01). This is the
result of two countervailing effects: officers likely decreased their propensity to engage in
misconduct with suspects to avoid another scandal, and suspects were more likely to re-
port abuse by police officers. The next two columns of Table 1 suggest that FPS complaint
rates increased by 0.014 (p<0.01) from 0.018 at baseline. As with Serious complaints, the
OIS Scandal caused a large increase in FPS complaints, indicating that either officer re-
sponse times and conduct were poorer and/or civilians were less tolerant of such conduct
due to the highly public scandal.
The OIS Scandal significantly increased the number of allegations of police miscon-
duct from both suspects and victims of crime, indicating a change in both officer and
civilian behavior. Given the simultaneity bias, the multiple mechanisms driving these
complaint changes are indistinguishable. For example, civilians may be more willing to
come forward when law enforcement is scrutinized, and officers may be less likely to
police aggressively; these mutually confounding mechanisms on complaint rates would
have contradicting effects but their occurrence would be simultaneous.
Panel C of Table 2 indicates that crime rates increase by 0.64-0.95 per 10,000 residents
(p<0.05) after the OIS Scandal, relative to a baseline mean of 11.85. The local linear spec-
ification indicates that the number of violent crimes increases by 12.3% relative to the
baseline mean (0.123 per 10,000 residents), while the coefficient of interest is smaller and
no longer significant when using the quadratic specification (0.123 vs. 0.044 per 10,000
17
residents).
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 suggest that property crime drove most of this increase
(note that non-violent crimes represent about 92% of the offenses); none of the coefficients
in these columns were significant for either the FOP or Kalven Notes. After the OIS Scan-
dal, the linear and quadratic specifications indicate that there was a 15% and 7% increase
in property crime (p<0.01 and p<0.05), respectively. Columns (7) and (8) indicate that the
OIS Scandal increased the number of other crimes, but the results are only significant at
the 10% level for the quadratic specification.
Panel C of Table 2 indicates that under the OIS Scandal almost all arrest types and
specifications produced insignificant and mostly negative results. The exceptions being
all arrests increasing by 8.8% (p<0.1) and Other arrests increasing by 10% (p<0.05), both
under the quadratic specification.
In comparison to the impacts on complaints and crime, none of the events had conclu-
sive impacts on the level of any type of arrest. Under the first two events, where crime did
not change significantly, this would indicate that policing was not negatively impacted,
while serious misconduct declined significantly in response to more self-monitoring. Un-
der the OIS Scandal, on the other hand, the increase in misconduct allegations and in-
creased level of crime coupled with no corresponding increase in arrests indicates a re-
duction in police effort. However, this result cannot be interpreted as a response to in-
creased self-monitoring because the scandal simultaneously changed civilian incentives
as indicated by the increase in complaints.
4 Chicago vs Rest of the U.S.
We complete our analysis by looking at the impact of oversight on crime outcomes by
comparing Chicago to other major cities in the U.S.. The panel structure of the data allows
us to control for Chicago’s unobserved characteristics and common trends that it shares




4.1.1 Sources and sample selection
The primary data source for this analysis is the UCR data for offenses known and clear-
ances by arrest from 1960 to 2016. This dataset has been collected by Kaplan [2018], who
constructed a monthly dataset on a police department-level basis for the following in-
dex crimes: murder, forcible rape, aggravated assault, battery, robbery, burglary, larceny,
and motor vehicle theft. We supplement those datasets with monthly average tempera-
ture and precipitation measurements for each county using data from the Daily Global
Historical Climatology Network (GHCN) (Menne and Houston [2012]).
Our analysis of crime data focuses on the period between January 2007 and December
2016. We focus on the Chicago Police Department and local police departments from
cities with populations exceeding 250,000 at any time between 2007 and 2016 in the UCR
data. Since Chicago is the third-largest city in the U.S., our preferred specification focuses
on cities with populations larger than 500,000, as this provides a more appropriate donor
pool to construct a counterfactual Chicago.
The main outcome of interest is the number of reported crimes per 100,000 residents
(i.e. crime rate) in a municipality. Because of the presence of zeros in the data, especially
for murder, we chose to analyze per 100,000 capita levels rather than logs or percent-
age changes. In order to account for seasonal patterns in crime outcomes, we consider
the residualized crime rates by regressing crime rates on month dummies and using the
residuals as the dependent variable.
For each department in our sample, we construct reported monthly crime rates for vio-
lent crimes (murder, robbery, aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary, larceny,
motor vehicle theft). Because the UCR does not systematically provide the number of
reported rapes for Chicago, we do not include this outcome in our analysis.
The number of arrests is an alternative outcome of interest that has been considered
by economists (Mas [2006], Shi [2009]). This measure can potentially capture the level of
police effort or activity to minimize the level of crimes. Unfortunately, the UCR data does
not systematically provide the number of crimes cleared by arrest for the Chicago Police
Department.
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As noted in Maltz and Weiss [2006], Evans and Owens [2007], Chalfin and McCrary
[2018], Mello [2019], the UCR data contains reporting errors that vary across agency.
Hence, the data requires thorough cleaning before use. We follow Mello [2019]’s regression-
based approach to identify record errors and extreme outliers (See Appendix A for more
details). We delete agencies that are flagged by our procedure as outliers. Following
Chalfin and McCrary [2018] and Mello [2019], we use a smoothed version of the measure
for the city population reported in the UCR.
We exclude agencies that report negative crimes and/or police departments that did
not report any crimes in a given year. We only consider local police departments for our
analysis (excluding sheriff’s departments, U.S. Marshals, state police, and other special
jurisdictions). Agencies with missing population data are also dropped.
Keeping cities that have been subject to major instances of public scrutiny and mon-
itoring in our control group may impact our results. For instance, the DOJ opened an
investigation into the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) in May 2015. The DOJ evalu-
ated whether or not BPD engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct that violated the US
Constitution or federal law. Our preferred specification restricts the donor pool to police
departments that have never been investigated by the DOJ under the Section 14141 of
the Violent Crime Act of 1994 (“pattern-or-practice cases” or “14141 cases”) in the con-
trol group (as well as requiring populations of at least 500,000). We discuss the impact of
including cities that were subject to DOJ investigation in Section 5.19
The resulting data set contains a panel of the Chicago Police Department and 24 to 67
additional local police agencies from January 2007 to December 2016, depending on the
restrictions. As discussed previously, our main specification only includes large jurisdic-
tions (population   500,000) that were not subject to DOJ investigation. Table A.1 and
Appendix A explain the sample selection criteria in more detail.
19During the time period of interest, the DOJ was particularly active and interested in police misconduct




Table 4 contains the summary information of Chicago compared to the rest of the US in
the sample from 2007 through 2016. Chicago’s population is more than two and a half
times that of the average city in the control group. Time-varying controls are present
at the county and monthly level such as average temperature and average precipitation.
Cities in the control group tend to be warmer and to have less precipitation than Chicago.
Crime rates (per 100,000 residents) are observed at the department level and aggre-
gated by month. Violent crime is comprised of aggravated assault and battery (assault),
murder, and robbery. While Chicago has an average assault rate less than one-third of the
rest of the U.S., Chicago’s murder and robbery rates are almost double those of the rest of
the country. Violent crime rates in the rest of the U.S. are double those in Chicago, primar-
ily due to the higher levels of assault in other jurisdictions. The rate of property crimes is
only about 5% lower in Chicago than elsewhere, and rates of burglary and larceny tend
to be higher in the rest of the U.S., while rates of motor vehicle theft tends to be higher in
Chicago. Figures 12 plot the trends in violent and property crime rates in Chicago and the
rest of the United States. These figures suggest that the rest of the United States may not
provide a suitable comparison group for Chicago to study the effects of the three events
of interest on crimes.
Given the drastically different composition of violent crime in other donor cities, the
synthetic control results for violent crime will overweigh assault in the construction of the
predicted path for the synthetic Chicago. As a result, we rely mostly on the more detailed
categories of violent crime for reasonable results.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
4.2.1 Setup
Our main goal is to understand how the increases in monitoring, identified by the three
events which induced variation in misconduct allegations, impacted crime rates in Chicago.
Our main challenge is to construct three counterfactuals for the city around the time of
each event. Let It be a post-treatment dummy and t0 be the date of treatment. Using the
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potential outcomes framework for causal inference (Neyman [1923], Rubin [1974], Hol-
land [1986]), let yct(0) and yct(1) be the potential outcomes for agency c at time t when
It = 1(t < t0) = 0 and It = 1(t   t0) = 1, where treatment indicates occurrence of
one of these events. The potential outcomes are given by yct(0) = x0ctg + f 0t lc + #ct and
yct(1) = bct + x0ctg + f 0t lc + #ct. The vector xct contains time varying controls. Time-
varying and agency specific unobservables are given by ft and lc, respectively.
The agency treatment effect at time t is bct = yct(1)  yct(0) for any agency c such that
t   t0. Because yct(1) is observed for treated units in post-treatment periods, the main
objective is to construct counterfactuals for each treated unit in post-treatment periods,
i.e., yct(0) for treated c and t   t0. Potential outcomes and the value of the treatment
determine the observed outcome such that
yct = yct(0) · (1   Dc It) + yct(1) · Dc It
where Dc equals one if the agency is Chicago, and zero otherwise. We use a combina-
tion of other U.S. police departments from the 24 to 67 municipalities discussed above to
construct a counterfactual control police department which resembles the Chicago Police
Department with respect to the relevant crime characteristics before the three events of
interest. We construct a panel of 48 months for each event to compare the different treat-
ment effects. The number of months, T = 48, corresponds to the maximum number of
periods such that each event can be observed with the same number of pre- and post-
periods. In each panel, date t0 = 0 corresponds to the date of the event, and each panel
has 34 pre-intervention (T0) periods and 14 post-intervention periods (T⇤).
4.2.2 Estimation
The treatment effect for the event of interest could be recovered using a difference-in-
difference approach, however visual evidence from Figure 12 suggests the “parallel trends”
assumption appears to be violated for some of our outcomes. Another approach to build
a counterfactual group for Chicago would use the synthetic control method from Abadie
and Gardeazabal [2003], Abadie et al. [2010, 2015]. This method constructs a weighted
average of control units that matches the treated unit’s pre-treatment outcomes. How-
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ever, the standard synthetic control method does not allow for multiple treated units and
treatment periods. We adopt the interactive fixed effects model from Xu [2017], which
generalizes the synthetic control method to cases of multiple treated units and treatment
periods. This model builds on the interactive fixed effect models from Bai [2009]. Athey
et al. [2018] generalize interactive fixed effects model (Bai [2009], Gobillon and Magnac
[2016], Xu [2017]), allowing for matrix completion. Following Xu [2017], treated and un-
treated units of the outcome variable are given by:
yct = bctDc It + x0ctg + f
0
t lc + #ct (2)
where ft are time-varying unobserved factors, lc are agency-specific factor loadings. The
number of factors is L. The variable Dc equals one if the agency is Chicago, and zero
otherwise; and It = 1(t   t0) is a time indicator of treatment, where t0 = 0 is the date of
the event. This model nests the traditional linear difference-in-differences model, which
is obtained when lc = (ac, 1)0 and ft = (1, tt)0, such that f 0t lc = ac + tt. Following Bai
[2009], we assume that #ct is uncorrelated with (xct, ft, lc), as well as other identification
conditions in Bai [2009] and Gobillon and Magnac [2016].
In order to construct a counterfactual group for Chicago, Xu [2017] proposed to first
estimate equation 2 using the control group data to recover (ĝ, f̂t, l̂c). Second, using
(ĝ, f̂t), recover the factor loadings for each treated unit (Dc = 1 ) by minimizing the mean
squared error of the predicted treated outcome in pre-treatment periods (t < t0 ), i.e.:









t correspond to the outcome, controls, and time-varying factors dur-
ing the pre-intervention periods, i.e. t < t0. Finally, construct counterfactual groups using
(ĝ, F̂, l̂c) and the treatment effect, b̂t, such that
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Counter f actual : ŷct(0) = x0ctĝ + f̂ 0t l̂c, f or Dc = 1 and t   t0





b̂ct, f or t   t0
where NT is the number of treated groups. In practice the exact number of factors L is
unknown. Xu [2017] develops a cross-validation procedure to determine the exact num-
ber of factors. The proposed method relies on control group information and information
from the treatment group before the intervention.
Standard errors for the generalized synthetic controls methods (GSC) are based on
parametric bootstraps (blocked at the agency level) of 10,000 replications. Xu [2017] pro-
vides details about the procedure but leaves a formal justification for future research. The
proposed method obtains uncertainty estimates conditional on observables, unobserved
factors, and factor loadings using a parametric bootstrap procedure by resampling the
residuals. Resampling the residuals preserves the serial correlation within the units (Beck
and Katz [1995], Xu [2017]). Details about the procedure can be found in Xu [2017]. Al-
though there is no formal justification for this procedure (Chernozhukov et al. [2017]), we
implement this method to conduct inference on our estimates.
4.3 Results
This section presents our main GSC results. As discussed previously, our main analysis
only considers cities with a populations of at least 500,000 which have not been subject
to DOJ investigation. Table 5 summarizes the effects of oversight on crime rates for the
three events when using the generalized synthetic control methods. For each outcome, we
report the mean of the dependent variable in Chicago during the pre-intervention period.
We account for seasonal patterns in crime outcomes by removing the month effect and
report the residuals of this regression.
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FOP Note
We present the results in Column (1) of Table 5. The FOP Note decreased violent crimes
while increasing property crimes. After this event, the number of violent crimes decrease
by 12.53 per 100,000 residents (p<0.05), which represents a drop of 12.7% relative to the
baseline mean in Chicago. The number of assaults and robberies dropped by 5.4 and 2.9
per 100,000 residents, while the murder rates increased by 0.057; however, none of the
effects on the different violent crime categories are statistically different from zero. The
increase in property crime seems to be driven by a significant increase in motor vehicle
theft of 8.6 per 100,000 residents (p<0.1), i.e., a 16% increase compared to the baseline
period in Chicago. Other property crimes, such as larceny and burglary, do not seem to
be impacted by the event. While robbery and assault decrease, murder is the only violent
crime that increases after the release of the note.
The pre-trends in crimes per 100,000 residents, presented in Figure 13 , indicate that
both Chicago and its counterfactual exhibit similar patterns. Most of the outcomes seems
to have similar trends after the release of the FOP Note. The number of violent crimes in
Chicago decreases relative to its counterfactual, while the number of motor vehicle thefts
increases after the union sent the note.
Figure 14 presents the gap in trends between Chicago and its counterfactual before and
after the FOP Note. The number of violent crimes declines after the release of the FOP
Note, though this finding is not statistically significant. The results by type of violent
crime separately remain close to zero and statistically non-significant. The FOP Note
increased the number of motor vehicle theft, but the other property crimes (larceny and
burglary) were not impacted.
Kalven Note
With the exception of the murder rate, Column (2) of Table 5 suggests that rates of all types
of crime decreased after the Kalven Note. However, robbery is the only variable that was
significantly impacted by the note (p<0.05). The reduction in robberies represent a drop
of 4.9 per 100,000 residents (mean at baseline is 37.4)
Figure 15 plots the trends in crimes per 100,000 residents for Chicago and its counter-
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factual before and after the Kalven Note. Chicago and its counterfactual display similar
trends during the pre-intervention period for all outcomes. The figures show high vari-
ance in Chicago’s murder time-series in both the pre- and post-intervention periods. In
the months following the Kalven Note, the number of motor vehicle thefts increased in
the counterfactual groups, whereas it remained stable in Chicago. The number of rob-
beries displays a similar pattern. Compared to Chicago, the number of assaults increases
in the counterfactual groups in the five months following the publication of the Kalven
Note.
Likewise, the total number of violent crimes increases in the counterfactual groups, a
result that is likely driven by the aforementioned increase in assault and the overweight-
ing of assault for the synthetic Chicago with respect to aggregated violent crimes. The
trends in violent crimes and assault between the two groups converge six months after the
Kalven Note. As previously mentioned, because the Kalven Note was published in the
same month as the nationally-covered event in Ferguson, it is plausible that cities in the
counterfactual group were more impacted by the events in Missouri than was Chicago.
Figure 16 presents the gap in trends between Chicago and its counterfactual before
and after the Kalven Note. The gap between the number of property crimes and incidents
of larceny, burglary, and murder are relatively flat and close to zero before and after the
event, as is the gap between the number of violent crimes and assaults. A negative spike
in violent crimes and assault in the month after the event is not significant. Motor vehicle
thefts and robberies seem to decline after the Kalven Note, but the confidence intervals
are too wide to reject the null hypothesis.
OIS Scandal
Crime rates in Chicago increase after the OIS Scandal. Except for motor vehicle theft, the
OIS Scandal tends to have a larger effect (in absolute value) on crime than either the FOP
or the Kalven Note. Column (3) of Table 5 indicates that violent crimes increased by about
8 per 100,000 residents after the OIS Scandal. Assault increased by 11 per 100,000 resi-
dents, which corresponds to a 29% increase compared to the baseline period in Chicago,
but this increase is not statistically significant. The number of robberies increased by
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5.83 (mean at baseline is 31.8) per 100,000 residents, and the effect is significant at the
10% level. The number of murders significantly increased by 0.68 per 100,000 residents
(p<0.01). In other words, relative to the counterfactual Chicago, there were 18.4 more
murders each month in the period post-OIS Scandal, as opposed to 1.4-1.6 (p>0.1) for the
FOP and Kalven Notes. The number of property crimes increased by 28 per 100,000 res-
idents (p<0.05). The scandal had a positive effect on burglary and larceny crimes and a
small negative effect on the number of motor vehicle thefts, but none of these effects were
statistically significant.
Figure 17 plots the trends in crimes per 100,000 residents for Chicago and its coun-
terfactual before and after the OIS Scandal. For most of the outcomes, Chicago and its
counterfactual display similar trends during the pre-intervention period. The only ex-
ception is for motor vehicle theft, which has different trends between Chicago and its
counterfactual during months -34 and -32. The post-intervention period suggests that
both the number of violent and property crimes increased. These figures confirm that
murder and robbery rates differ after the OIS Scandal.
Figure 18 presents the gap in trends between Chicago and its counterfactual before
and after the OIS Scandal. We find that the number of violent crimes per 100,000 residents
increased after the scandal, but that the effect has a relatively wide confidence interval and
is not statistically significant. There is a statistically significant increase in the number of
murders and robberies for some periods post-event. The results for property crimes are
too imprecise to draw any conclusions.
5 Robustness
5.1 Chicago level analysis
The validity of our RD design requires that the conditional expectation E[#bt|datebt] is
smooth as datebt crosses the RD threshold (Anderson [2014]). One threat to our design
could be that officers or civilians alter their behavior in anticipation to a change in mon-
itoring. Although, the exact timing of the three events are plausibly exogenous, it is im-
portant to rule out any possibility of anticipation or avoidance effects.
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Tables A.3-A.11 estimate a “donut” RD by removing observations near the threshold
(Barreca et al. [2011]) to evaluate if our estimates are sensitive to observations close to
the cutoff. We consider three donut RDs and remove: (1) the month of the event, (2) the
month of the event and the preceding month, and (3) the month of the event and two
preceding months. We find that the results remain qualitatively similar to those found in
Section 3.3.20
We run a series of placebo tests. Each placebo estimate first assigns a window around
a false event date, and then uses an RD to estimate the effect of oversight on complaints,
crimes, and arrests. To avoid having the placebo estimates be influenced by any jump at
the true cutoff, the placebo window is between from April 2013 to January 2014. The win-
dow is chosen so that: (1) it does not include the six months post-event, and (2) we have
34 months preceding the placebo event, and six months following the placebo date. Note
that our placebos are still partially treated by the FOP Note as we do not have enough
data before that event.
Figures A.5-A.7 graph the true and placebo RD estimates. We also report the 10th and
90th percentiles of our preferred specification. As the graphs make clear, we see the that
the number of Serious complaints significantly decreased after the release of FOP Note,
and increased after the OIS Scandal. FPS complaints also increased significantly after the
scandal. These results support the main conclusions from our original RD.
5.2 Chicago vs Rest of the U.S
Alternative control groups As discussed previously, our primary analysis focuses on
cities that have not been subject to DOJ investigation and with populations of at least
500,000. Table A.12 provides the results of the supplemental analysis.
We consider three additional sample constructions for the donor pool. Sample 1 cor-
responds to cities with at least 250,000 people. Sample 2 corresponds to cities with at least
250,000 people but excludes cities that were subject to DOJ investigation at some point
20Our choice of bandwidth is limited since we only have 5 months of complaints data after the OIS
Scandal, therefore we cannot perform bandwidth selection adjustments for few mass points in the running
variable in the spirit of Imbens and Kalyanaraman [2012].
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since 1994.21 Sample 3 is cities with a population of at least 500,000. Both Sample 1 and
Sample 3 permit cities with prior DOJ investigations.
Overall, results from Table A.12 are qualitatively similar to those drawn from Table
5. We do not find evidence that self-monitoring increases crime, while the OIS Scandal
resulted in a significant increase in murders and robberies. The alternative sample selec-
tions indicate that including cities which were investigated by the DOJ and those with
populations smaller than 500,000 residents produced less precise estimates from our pre-
ferred sample. The GSC estimation seems to be sensitive to the composition of the donor
pool sample.
Synthetic Control Methods As a complementary approach to the general synthetic con-
trol methods, we turn to the synthetic control methods developed in Abadie and Gardeaz-
abal [2003], Abadie et al. [2010, 2015]. The main idea of this method is to construct a
synthetic match for Chicago by using the agencies in the control group (i.e. the rest of
the U.S.) in such a way that the synthetic control has similar behavior to Chicago before
the event of interest. The synthetic control (counterfactual Chicago) is constructed as a
weighted average of control units in order to match pre-intervention outcomes for the
treated units. The weights are restricted to be non-negative and sum to one. Inference is
based on placebo permutation to test if the results are driven by chance using Jones and
Marinescu [2018]. Table A.13 summarizes the effects of oversight on crime rates for the
three type events when using synthetic control methods.
Overall, these results are qualitatively similar to those drawn from Table 5. Most of the
results are statistically nonsignificant when using synthetic control methods and inference
using placebo permutations.
The FOP Note increases the number of motor vehicle thefts by about 10 per 100,000
residents (p<0.05). With the exception of murder, he Kalven Note is associated with de-
creased crime rates.
This table also suggests that the number of crimes went up for all outcomes after the
OIS Scandal. The scandal had a significant impact on murder and robbery rates (p<0.1),
and the estimated effects are higher than the 95th percentiles of the placebo distribution.
21Corresponding to the implementation §14141 of the Violent Crime Act of 1994
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The remaining outcomes are within the 5th and 95th percentiles of the placebo distribu-
tion.
6 Discussion
We provide evidence which both expands on and reinterprets previous research on the
impact of policing the police. Our findings comport with research, such as (Prendergast
[2001], Shi [2009], Heaton [2010]), which finds that during periods of major reform follow-
ing police scandals, when public scrutiny is unusually high and police officers are most
cautious, crime rises and police effort declines. We find that following an officer-involved
shooting (OIS) scandal, murder and robbery increase but arrests, a proxy for officer ef-
fort, do not. These results, along with previous research, would appear to confirm the
“Ferguson Effect” theory– that increased scrutiny of police tactics and increased political
pressure to prosecute police misconduct leads to reduced effort by officers and causes
crime to rise. We provide novel evidence that confirms public scrutiny increases during
scandals, by showing that civilian complaints increase significantly after the OIS, despite
unchanged arrest levels in response to increased crime.
We interpret these results, in the context of a simultaneity bias inherent in measuring
the impact of a scandal as a substitute for oversight on policing outcomes. Simply put,
periods of public outrage are not representative of an oversight regime, due to inflated
public-monitoring and social unrest. Oversight reforms are largely targeted at internal
reform and increased self-imposed monitoring by officers, meaning they do not rely on
heightened public vigilance and public attention to reduce misconduct. Furthermore,
civilian incentives change during public scandals such that, even in the absence of offi-
cers’ increased restraint, potential criminals may be simultaneously responding to general
social unrest and mistrust of police by committing more crimes. Distrust in communities
hampers crime reporting (Desmond et al. [2016]), which may, holding enforcement con-
stant, increase criminal opportunities. As such, we argue that scandal-based estimates of
the effect of oversight on outcomes such as crime and police effort are contaminated by a
simultaneity bias due to the simultaneous changes in civilian and officer incentives which
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would both, independently, increase crime.
By studying increases in self-monitoring during periods without public scandals, we
isolate the impact of oversight on misconduct, crime, and effort. We find that notes from
executives of the police union cautioning officers about the seriousness of misconduct al-
legations, largely unknown to the public, induce a reduction in complaints, particularly
allegations of constitutional rights violations, without an increase in crime or a change in
arrests. Our analysis demonstrates that police officers are highly responsive to internal
oversight mechanisms, even when they do not carry specific incentive shifts or height-
ened negative consequences. This complements the work of Mummolo [2018], which
finds that officers are highly responsive to internal directives and that increased oversight
by commanders can improve police productivity.
Moreover, scandal-based studies have thus far focused on short-term outcomes. It
is possible that long-term crime rates and rates of misconduct are lower following re-
forms once public outrage has subsided, due to increased effectiveness, better culture,
and more community trust. The long-run effects of public scandals that lead to reform
and increased monitoring provide a more nuanced story. Police scandals in the US have
triggered DOJ investigations and police reforms under §14141 of the Violent Crime Act
of 1994 (DOJ [2017]). Studies have shown that agreements, resulting from major reforms
brought about by DOJ investigations, generally were successful in terms of implementing
effective and constitutional policing practices and improving police-community relations
in the long run. For instance, Stone et al. [2009] found that the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment consent decree improved both the quantity and quality of policing while reducing
crime. Chanin [2015] studies the effect of police reforms in Pittsburgh, Washington D.C.,
and Cincinnati, and finds that reforms increased accountability practices and reduced
police misconduct without increasing crime.
Given our results, a potential solution for policymakers is to consider proactive poli-
cies that will increase police monitoring, without waiting for a public scandal to occur.
Such proactive policies should engage key stakeholders; in particular, police unions can
act as powerful agents for increasing officers’ self-monitoring. Proactive accountability
policies may also reduce the likelihood of a major officer-involved-shooting scandal that
could lead to civilian distrust, increased crime, and major settlement costs to tax payers
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(Schwartz [2014, 2016], Rozema and Schanzenbach [2018]). Self-monitoring may induce
better behavior from officers toward civilians, leading to increased legitimacy of legal au-
thorities and heightened community trust. This directly and indirectly increases civilian
compliance with the law and cooperation in investigations, as well as making it more
difficult for civilians to engage in criminal activities (Skogan and Frydl [2004], Tyler et al.
[2015], Desmond et al. [2016]).
Our research has the following limitations. First, we focus primarily on short-run out-
comes, as a result of data availability constraints. However, to the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first to link the impact of oversight on different types of misconduct,
crime, and arrests. Second, the qualitative nature of our events means we cannot directly
measure the level of oversight at any given time. Third, both our events are memos from
the police union; while they were effective in increasing self-monitoring, other internal
reforms, such as introducing more robust oversight regimes, may be differentially im-
pactful on policing outcomes. Nevertheless, we maintain our results show there is a key
distinction between policing outcomes under oversight and public outrage.
7 Conclusion
The tradeoff between police oversight and effective policing is documented in a literature
largely focusing on periods of high public scrutiny of the police and subsequent reforms
(Prendergast [2001], Shi [2009], Heaton [2010]). Such scandals induce officers to increase
self-monitoring as a form of self-protection against misconduct accusations and further
scandal. However, as a result of the civil unrest and civilian distrust following a scandal,
civilians simultaneously become more critical of officer actions and less likely to obey
laws and authorities. We provide evidence that estimates of oversight’s effect on crime
levels during scandals are contaminated by this simultaneity bias.
To avoid this issue, we identify two events that only impacted Chicago police officers’
level of self-monitoring by increasing their perceived cost of a misconduct allegation. The
first event, an article in the Chicago police union newsletter following an unfavorable
court ruling, occurred in 2009, years before the national spotlight turned to police mis-
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conduct. The second event, another police union note following the decision in Kalven
v. City of Chicago, occurred in 2014. Both events induced little, if any, public scrutiny, as
evidenced by the absence of a change in reporting topics around policing in the Chicago
Tribune.
Both of the notes significantly decreased the number of complaints against officers
for constitutional violations and had no impact on complaints related to workplace con-
duct, indicating officers solely increased self-monitoring during interactions with civil-
ians. Furthermore, we find no evidence of increased crime rates across all types of crime
as well as no impact on arrests. Such results indicate that the increase in self-monitoring,
in the absence of an increase in public-monitoring and its complementary civilian dis-
trust, improved officer conduct while having no adverse impact on public safety.
There are three key takeaways from this paper. First, evaluating the impact of a change
in police oversight on policing is challenging as it can impact both civilian and officer
behavior. Second, increasing officer self-monitoring through cautionary notes or other
“encouragement” by police unions are likely to be effective avenues for decreasing mis-
conduct while maintaining effective policing and public safety. Policymakers should take
into consideration the effectiveness of internal directives and the union’s role in influenc-
ing officer conduct in the absence of public pressure. Lastly, while this paper offers em-
pirical evidence for proposed police incentives, there is need for a more comprehensive
theoretical model of police officers’ objective function as well as that of civilian interac-
tions with officers.
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Notes: This figure presents the total number of allegation of misconduct against a Chicago
police officer from January 2007 to May 2016. The dashed lines represent three events that
have varied the level of monitoring against Chicago Police Department between 2007 and
2016: a note from the FOP, a notification from the police union stating that complaints
against Chicago police officers are available to the public (Kalven Note), and a scandal
related to an officer shooting and killing an adolescent (OIS Scandal). Section 2, in the
main text, describes each event in detail.
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Figure 2: Articles related to the Chicago Police Department in the Chicago Tribune
Notes: These figures present the number of articles mentioning the Chicago Police Department in the Chicago Tribune
from January 2007 to December 2018. The left-figure presents the frequency distribution of articles related to gun-
violence, police accountability, and police misconduct.The left-figure presents the frequency distribution of articles
mentioning the DOJ and the Chicago police union.
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Figure 3: Effect of the FOP Note on the number of complaints per 10,000 residents
Notes: These figures present the impact of the FOP Notes on complaints per 10,000 residents. We
report the lines from local linear and quadratic regressions, estimated separately on each side of
the cutoff. We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report
the residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable and RD estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. Dashed lines
correspond to the 90% confidence interval for the quadratic specification. In each graph, the scale
of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 4: Effect of the Kalven Note on the number of complaints per 10,000 residents
Notes: These figures present the impact of the Kalven Note on complaints per 10,000 residents.We
report the lines from local linear and quadratic regressions, estimated separately on each side of
the cutoff. We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report
the residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable and RD estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. Dashed lines
correspond to the 90% confidence interval for the quadratic specification. In each graph, the scale
of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 5: Effect of the OIS Scandal on the number of complaints per 10,000 residents
Notes: These figures present the impact of the OIS Scandal on complaints per 10,000 residents. We
report the lines from local linear and quadratic regressions, estimated separately on each side of
the cutoff. We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report
the residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable and RD estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. Dashed lines
correspond to the 90% confidence interval for the quadratic specification. In each graph, the scale
of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 6: Effect of the FOP Note on the number of crimes per 10,000 residents
Notes: These figures present the impact of the FOP Note on crimes per 10,000 residents. We
report the lines from local linear and quadratic regressions, estimated separately on each side of
the cutoff. We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report
the residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable and RD estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. Dashed lines
correspond to the 90% confidence interval for the quadratic specification. In each graph, the scale
of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 7: Effect of the Kalven Note on the number of crimes per 10,000 residents
Notes: These figures present the impact of the Kalven Note on crimes per 10,000 residents. We
report the lines from local linear and quadratic regressions, estimated separately on each side of
the cutoff. We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report
the residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable and RD estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. Dashed lines
correspond to the 90% confidence interval for the quadratic specification. In each graph, the scale
of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 8: Effect of the OIS Scandal on the number of crimes per 10,000 residents
Notes: These figures present the impact of the OIS Scandal on crimes per 10,000 residents. We
report the lines from local linear and quadratic regressions, estimated separately on each side of
the cutoff. We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report
the residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable and RD estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. Dashed lines
correspond to the 90% confidence interval for the quadratic specification. In each graph, the scale
of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 9: Effect of the FOP Note on the number of arrests per 10,000 residents
Notes: These figures present the impact of the FOP Note on arrests per 10,000 residents. We
report the lines from local linear and quadratic regressions, estimated separately on each side of
the cutoff. We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report
the residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable and RD estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. Dashed lines
correspond to the 90% confidence interval for the quadratic specification. In each graph, the scale
of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 10: Effect of the Kalven Note on the number of arrests per 10,000 residents
Notes: These figures present the impact of the Kalven Note on arrests per 10,000 residents. We
report the lines from local linear and quadratic regressions, estimated separately on each side of
the cutoff. We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report
the residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable and RD estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. Dashed lines
correspond to the 90% confidence interval for the quadratic specification. In each graph, the scale
of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
51
Figure 11: Effect of the OIS Scandal on the number of arrests per 10,000 residents
Notes: These figures present the impact of the OIS Scandal on arrests per 10,000 residents. We
report the lines from local linear and quadratic regressions, estimated separately on each side of
the cutoff. We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report
the residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable and RD estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. Dashed lines
correspond to the 90% confidence interval for the quadratic specification. In each graph, the scale
of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 12: Seasonality adjusted crimes rates: Chicago vs. the rest of the U.S.
Notes: These figures present the number of reported property and violent crimes per 100,000 capita in Chicago and
the rest of U.S. from January 2007 to December 2016. We account for seasonal patterns in crime outcomes, i.e., we
remove the month effect and report the residuals of this regression (some outcomes can have negative values). The
vertical dashed lines represent three events that have varied the level of monitoring against Chicago Police Department
between 2007 and 2016 (see Section 2).
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Figure 13: Trends in crimes before and after the FOP Note using generalized synthetic control methods: treated vs.
counterfactual
Notes: These figures present the trends in crimes per 100,000 capita in Chicago and its counterfactual from January 2007 to
December 2016. We account for seasonal patterns in crime outcomes, i.e., we remove the month effect and report the residuals of
this regression (some outcomes can have negative values). The vertical dashed line represent the time of the event that varied the
level of monitoring against Chicago Police Department between 2007 and 2016 (see Section 2). The event of interest corresponds
to the FOP Note. In each graph, the scale of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 14: Estimated Average Treatment Effect before and after the FOP Note using generalized synthetic control
methods
Notes: These figures present the estimated average treatment effect of the event on the number of crimes per 100,000 capita in
Chicago and its counterfactual from January 2007 to December 2016. Dashed lines correspond to the 95% confidence interval.We
account for seasonal patterns in crime outcomes, i.e., we remove the month effect and report the residuals of this regression (some
outcomes can have negative values). The vertical dashed line represent the time of the event that varied the level of monitoring
against Chicago Police Department between 2007 and 2016 (see Section 2). The event of interest corresponds to the FOP Note. In
each graph, the scale of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 15: Trends in crimes before and after the Kalven Note using generalized synthetic control methods: treated vs.
counterfactual
Notes: These figures present the trends in crimes per 100,000 capita in Chicago and its counterfactual from January 2007 to
December 2016. We account for seasonal patterns in crime outcomes, i.e., we remove the month effect and report the residuals of
this regression (some outcomes can have negative values). The vertical dashed line represent the time of the event that varied the
level of monitoring against Chicago Police Department between 2007 and 2016 (see Section 2). The event of interest corresponds
to the Kalven Note. In each graph, the scale of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 16: Estimated Average Treatment Effect in crimes before and after the Kalven Note using generalized synthetic
control methods
Notes: These figures present the estimated average treatment effect of the event on the number of crimes per 100,000 capita in
Chicago and its counterfactual from January 2007 to December 2016. Dashed lines correspond to the 95% confidence interval.We
account for seasonal patterns in crime outcomes, i.e., we remove the month effect and report the residuals of this regression (some
outcomes can have negative values). The vertical dashed line represent the time of the event that varied the level of monitoring
against Chicago Police Department between 2007 and 2016 (see Section 2). The event of interest corresponds to the Kalven Note.
In each graph, the scale of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 17: Trends in crimes before and after the OIS Scandal using generalized synthetic control methods: treated vs.
counterfactual
Notes: These figures present the trends in crimes per 100,000 capita in Chicago and its counterfactual from January 2007 to
December 2016. We account for seasonal patterns in crime outcomes, i.e., we remove the month effect and report the residuals of
this regression (some outcomes can have negative values). The vertical dashed line represent the time of the event that varied the
level of monitoring against Chicago Police Department between 2007 and 2016 (see Section 2). The event of interest corresponds
to the OIS Scandal. In each graph, the scale of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Figure 18: Estimated Average Treatment Effect in crimes before and after the OIS Scandal using generalized synthetic
control methods
Notes: These figures present the estimated average treatment effect of the event on the number of crimes per 100,000 capita in
Chicago and its counterfactual from January 2007 to December 2016. Dashed lines correspond to the 95% confidence interval.We
account for seasonal patterns in crime outcomes, i.e., we remove the month effect and report the residuals of this regression (some
outcomes can have negative values). The vertical dashed line represent the time of the event that varied the level of monitoring
against Chicago Police Department between 2007 and 2016 (see Section 2). The event of interest corresponds to the OIS Scandal.
In each graph, the scale of the y-axis is set equal to ±.5 standard deviation of the respective variable.
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Table 1: Complaints response to monitoring
All All Serious Serious FPS FPS Other Other Unkn. Unkn.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event -0.027** -0.011 -0.010** -0.022*** -0.007** 0.009* 0.000 0.010 -0.010 -0.007
(0.010) (0.016) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Mean pre-event 0.259 0.259 0.088 0.088 0.034 0.034 0.040 0.040 0.098 0.098
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event -0.022* -0.024* -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.004
(0.011) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Mean pre-event 0.197 0.197 0.063 0.063 0.025 0.025 0.033 0.033 0.076 0.076
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event 0.054*** 0.082*** 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.005 0.005 0.022*** 0.036***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Mean pre-event 0.147 0.147 0.044 0.044 0.018 0.018 0.029 0.029 0.056 0.056
No of obs. 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of complaints per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January
2007 to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the
residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are
clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table 2: Crimes response to monitoring
All All Violent Violent Property Property Other Other
Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event 0.254 0.534 -0.060 0.016 -0.018 0.253 0.332 0.266
(0.378) (0.462) (0.040) (0.048) (0.161) (0.188) (0.233) (0.292)
Mean pre-event 15.608 15.608 1.285 1.285 4.693 4.693 9.630 9.630
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event -0.065 0.159 -0.010 -0.020 -0.163 0.030 0.107 0.148
(0.283) (0.305) (0.028) (0.036) (0.104) (0.119) (0.216) (0.230)
Mean pre-event 13.056 13.056 1.088 1.088 4.034 4.034 7.933 7.933
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event 0.953*** 0.642** 0.123*** 0.044 0.528*** 0.245** 0.302 0.353*
(0.278) (0.266) (0.033) (0.038) (0.102) (0.100) (0.202) (0.203)
Mean pre-event 11.845 11.845 0.994 0.994 3.468 3.468 7.383 7.383
No of obs. 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of crimes per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January 2007
to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the residuals
of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are clustered at
the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table 3: Arrests response to monitoring
All All Violent Violent Property Property Other Other
Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event 0.758*** -0.031 0.032*** 0.017 0.067 0.049 0.659*** -0.097
(0.167) (0.219) (0.011) (0.014) (0.043) (0.055) (0.145) (0.188)
Mean pre-event 4.607 4.607 0.229 0.229 0.467 0.467 3.911 3.911
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event -0.005 -0.110 -0.003 -0.004 -0.009 0.008 0.007 -0.113
(0.154) (0.165) (0.009) (0.012) (0.027) (0.030) (0.150) (0.159)
Mean pre-event 3.952 3.952 0.194 0.194 0.381 0.381 3.377 3.377
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event -0.105 0.268* -0.002 -0.001 0.008 -0.005 -0.111 0.274**
(0.144) (0.143) (0.011) (0.013) (0.021) (0.024) (0.138) (0.136)
Mean pre-event 3.619 3.619 0.183 0.183 0.352 0.352 3.084 3.084
No of obs. 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384 9384
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of arrests per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January 2007
to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the residuals
of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are clustered at
the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table 4: Summary statistics: Chicago vs. the rest of the U.S.
Rest of U.S. Chicago




Property crime 351.17 326.20
Burglary 77.44 64.23
Larceny 230.46 215.73





Notes: The sample used is Chicago and a set of 24 large U.S. cities (population>499,999) from January 2007 to Decem-
ber 2016. The reported crimes are per 100,000 capita and this does not adjust for the seasonality patterns in crime.
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Table 5: Effect of monitoring on crime
FOP Note Kalven Note OIS Scandal
(1) (2) (3)
Violent -12.532** -5.885 8.61
(6.058) (9.59) (12.386)
Mean Chicagot<t0 98.854 75.806 71.793
Assault -5.428 -3.618 11.099
(8.046) (8.527) (19.377)
Mean Chicagot<t0 50.206 37.096 38.673
Murder 0.061 0.053 0.678***
(0.156) (0.156) (0.19)
Mean Chicagot<t0 1.397 1.353 1.341
Robbery -2.858 -4.861** 5.825*
(2.688) (2.012) (3.2)
Mean Chicagot<t0 47.251 37.358 31.779
Property 17.387 -3.272 27.773**
(30.862) (22.147) (15.095)
Mean Chicagot<t0 373.701 311.613 269.479
Burglary 2.9 -3.075 4.586
(8.601) (5.043) (3.788)
Mean Chicagot<t0 75.79 60.172 46.479
Larceny -2.204 -6.617 9.594
(19.347) (15.869) (13.925)
Mean Chicagot<t0 245.693 208.228 189.426
Motor Vehicle Theft 8.57* -2.173 -1.51
(4.568) (5.081) (3.67)
Mean Chicagot<t0 52.219 43.213 33.574
No. of Cities 25 25 25
No. of Observation 1200 1200 1200
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversight on crimes per 100,000 capita (see Section 2). We account for seasonal
patterns in crime outcomes by removing the city-month effect and report the residuals of this regression. Standard
errors for the generalized synthetic controls methods (GSC) are based on parametric bootstraps (blocked at the agency




A.1 Cleaning UCR data
The annual city population reported in the FBI files tends to jump discretely around cen-
sus years (Chalfin and McCrary [2018], Mello [2019]). We follow Mello [2019] and replace
the reported population with a smoothed version. For each city, we fit the population
time series using local linear regression and replace the reported population with the fit-
ted values.
Similar to Mello [2019], we developed a regression-based procedure to detect cities
with extreme outliers and record errors. For each agency, we fit the time series of police
reported crimes for assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, larceny, and robbery using a
local linear regression with bandwidth two. We do not use this procedure for murder be-
cause it is a relatively rare event. For each crime k, let yk,ct and y
pr
k,ct be the actual reported
crime and predicted reported crime from the local linear regression for agency c during










For each agency we compute
dc = max(dc,assault; dc,burglary; dc,larceny; dc,robbery; dc,motor vehicle the f t)
We consider an agency to be an extreme outlier or to have a recorded error if dc > 1.5.
Agencies flagged as outliers are deleted from our data.
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A.2 Sample selection and Cities
Table A.1: Sample construction for UCR data
Step Description No. Obs No. of agency
1 RAW 2884056 22645
2 Drop agency if U.S. Park and State Police 2396724 19623
3 Drop agency if ever missing population 1924356 15349
4 Merge Crosswalk 1916040 15070
5 Keep agency if local police department 1522704 12088
6 Drop agency if not main agency 1520868 12068
7 Drop agency if reported no offense between 1985-2012 1506144 11854
8 Keep cities with population>249,999 12276 93
9 Drop agency if any outliers 9372 71
10 Merge population 9372 71
11 Drop agency if any mistakes 9372 71
12 Drop agency if any negative values for crime 8976 68
13 Drop agency if any missing values 8976 68
14 Drop agency if no crime 8976 68
15 Keep if 2007 and after 8160 68
16 Keep if balanced panel 8160 68
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Table A.2: Selected cities
Min. Max. Any Any DOJ
ORI Department State Population Population outliers #crimes <0 reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NM00101 Albuquerque Police Dpt. New Mexico 500,955 561,560 X
CA03001 Anaheim Police Dpt. California 333,746 353,504
AK00101 Anchorage Police Dpt. Alaska 277,692 301,306
MD00202 Anne Arundel County Police Dpt. Maryland 471,702 526,312 X
TX22001 Arlington Police Dpt. Texas 365,438 392,666
GAAPD00 Atlanta Police Dpt. Georgia 391,711 513,552
CO00101 Aurora Police Dpt. Colorado 259,704 320,296
TX22701 Austin Police Dpt. Texas 695,202 892,570
CA01502 Bakersfield Police Dpt. California 298,198 378,788
MD00301 Baltimore County Police Dpt. Maryland 785,567 831,374 X
MDBPD00 Baltimore Police Dpt. Maryland 618,385 638,755 X
MA01301 Boston Police Dpt. Massachusetts 562,393 673,880
NY01401 Buffalo Police Dpt. New York 257,446 280,494 X
AZ00705 Chandler Police Dpt. Arizona 236,123 265,922
NC06001 Charlotte - Mecklenburg Police Dpt. North Carolina 699,398 896,379
VA02101 Chesterfield County Police Dpt. Virginia 291,755 337,610
ILCPD00 Chicago Police Dpt. Illinois 2,695,598 2,857,426 X
OHCIP00 Cincinnati Police Dpt. Ohio 296,204 333,568 X
OHCLP00 Cleveland Police Dpt. Ohio 386,227 452,759 X X
GA03302 Cobb County Police Dpt. Georgia 500,622 555,827 X
CO02101 Colorado Springs Police Dpt. Colorado 374,112 464,113
OHCOP00 Columbus Police Dpt. Ohio 720,599 844,206 X
TX17802 Corpus Christi Police Dpt. Texas 286,265 327,948
TXDPD00 Dallas Police Dpt. Texas 1,124,352 1,238,731
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Table A.2: Selected cities (Continued)
Min. Max. Any Any DOJ
ORI Department State Population Population outliers #crimes <0 reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GA04402 Dekalb County Police Dpt. Georgia 522,329 641,847
CODPD00 Denver Police Dpt. Colorado 568,465 699,259
MI82349 Detroit Police Dpt. Michigan 669,673 908,441 X
TX07102 El Paso Police Dpt. Texas 612,374 687,193
VA02901 Fairfax County Police Dpt. Virginia 974,142 1,106,066
IN00201 Fort Wayne Police Indiana 224,820 261,642 X
TX22012 Fort Worth Police Dpt. Texas 640,066 842,880
CA01005 Fresno Police Dpt. California 465,269 524,796
NC04102 Greensboro Police Dpt. North Carolina 236,591 288,618 X
GA06702 Gwinnett County Police Dpt. Georgia 625,988 775,883 X
NV00203 Henderson Police Dpt. Nevada 239,906 291,584 X
VA04301 Henrico County Division Of Police Virginia 283,377 326,958
HI00200 Honolulu (City And County) Police Dpt. Hawaii 905,903 999,307 X
TXHPD00 Houston Police Dpt. Texas 2,031,116 2,285,709
MD01401 Howard County Police Dpt. Maryland 270,195 316,777
FL01602 Jacksonville City County PD Florida 795,822 880,557 X
MOKPD00 Kansas City Police Dpt. Missouri 302,696 334,250
NV00201 Las Vegas Metro Police Dpt. Nevada 1,315,625 1,592,178
KY03402 Lexington Division Of Police Kentucky 270,179 317,853
NB05501 Lincoln Police Dpt. Nebraska 240,511 281,138 X
CA01941 Long Beach Police Dpt. California 462,257 478,283
CA01942 Los Angeles Police Dpt. California 3,792,621 4,007,905 X
KY05680 Louisville Metro Police Dpt. Kentucky 624,030 683,825
TNMPD00 Memphis Police Dpt. Tennessee 646,889 680,828
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Table A.2: Selected cities (Continued)
Min. Max. Any Any DOJ
ORI Department State Population Population outliers #crimes <0 reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AZ00717 Mesa Police Dpt. Arizona 439,041 478,277
FL01306 Miami Police Dpt. Florida 392,934 449,469 X X
FL01300 Miami-Dade (County) Police Dpt. Florida 1,057,396 1,208,251 X
WIMPD00 Milwaukee Police Dpt. Wisconsin 572,938 604,673
MN02711 Minneapolis Police Dpt. Minnesota 371,240 416,751 X
AL00201 Mobile Police Dpt. Alabama 246,171 253,842 X
MD01604 Montgomery County Police Dpt. Maryland 911,528 1,027,318 X
TN01901 Nashville Metro Police Dpt. Tennessee 560,813 668,685
NY02900 Nassau County Police Dpt. New York 1,030,495 1,069,316 X
DE00203 New Castle County Police Dpt. Delaware 401,952 416,940
LANPD00 New Orleans Police Dpt. Louisiana 220,614 431,153 X
NY03030 New York City Police Dpt. New York 8,165,001 8,566,917 X
NJNPD00 Newark Police New Jersey 277,140 281,450 X X
CA00109 Oakland Police Dpt. California 390,724 424,998
OK05506 Oklahoma City Police Dpt. Oklahoma 450,694 519,817
NB02802 Omaha Police Dept Nebraska 408,958 452,252
PAPEP00 Philadelphia Police Dpt. Pennsylvania 1,435,533 1,570,826
AZ00723 Phoenix Police Dpt. Arizona 1,445,632 1,597,397
PAPPD00 Pittsburgh Police Dpt. Pennsylvania 302,443 324,604 X
TX04306 Plano Police Dpt. Texas 254,476 282,308
OR02602 Portland Police Bureau Oregon 535,763 639,601 X X
MD01721 Prince George’s County Police Dpt. Maryland 633,458 705,672 X X
VA07503 Prince William County Police Dpt. Virginia 344,711 449,968
NC09201 Raleigh Police Dpt. North Carolina 347,755 459,399 X
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Table A.2: Selected cities (Continued)
Min. Max. Any Any DOJ
ORI Department State Population Population outliers #crimes <0 reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA03313 Riverside Police Dpt. California 292,698 325,896
CA03404 Sacramento Police Dpt. California 460,546 495,471
TXSPD00 San Antonio Police Dpt. Texas 1,292,116 1,498,615
CA03711 San Diego Police Dpt. California 1,261,196 1,413,414
CA03801 San Francisco Police Dpt. California 733,799 871,155
CA04313 San Jose Police Dpt. California 920,548 1,041,844
CA03019 Santa Ana Police Dpt. California 324,528 343,433
WASPD00 Seattle Police Dpt. Washington 583,772 700,313 X
MOSPD00 St. Louis (City) Police Dept Missouri 314,507 356,204
MO09500 St. Louis County Police Dept Missouri 387,404 412,201
MN06209 St. Paul Police Dpt. Minnesota 271,662 303,920 X
CA03905 Stockton Police Dpt. California 289,510 308,348
NY05101 Suffolk County Police Dpt. New York 1,308,750 1,360,739 X
FL02902 Tampa Police Dpt. Florida 331,487 375,904 X
OH04807 Toledo Police Dpt. Ohio 278,366 317,401 X
AZ01003 Tucson Police Dpt. Arizona 520,116 547,981 X
OK07205 Tulsa Police Dpt. Oklahoma 375,312 399,437
UT01800 Unified Police Dpt. of Greater Salt Lake Utah 233,219 349,050
VA12800 Virginia Beach Police Dpt. Virginia 434,163 453,017
DCMPD00 Washington Metropolitan Police Dpt. D.C. 581,530 681,170 X
KS08703 Wichita Police Dpt. Kansas 357,372 391,399
Notes: This table reports the 93 police departments from cities with populations exceeding 250,000 at some point in
the period analyzed (2007-2016). The fourth and fifth columns report indicate if we flag the department as an outlier
or if it reported any negative crimes. The final sample does not include flagged departments. Column (6) includes
cities that entered into reform agreements in pattern-or-practice policing cases (14141 cases) or are under investigation
or active litigation in January 2017.
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that a report is required in this investiga-
tion notify the Lodge and we will assist 
you in the completion of your written 
report.  Officers don’t take anything for 
granted in regards to these investigations.  
You could be a witness on Monday and 
then the accused on Tuesday.  When no-
tified of being a witness in a CR investi-
gation, please contact the Lodge and we 
will assist you in these matters.  It is your 
contractual right! 
Parole Board Hearings 
     The Lodge was recently notified of 
the Parole Board Hearing which were 
conducted at 26
th
 & California on 21 Oc-
tober 2009 for us to protest the possibility 
for parole for the convicted murderer of 
PO Herman Stallworth, #10965, 003
rd
 
District, End of Watch 24 May 1967. 
     Attending this hearing was a represen-
tative of the Department, the Police Me-
morial Foundation, an Assistant States 
Attorney (ASA), two CPD Detectives 
and I, representing the Lodge.  The hear-
ing which is video taped and was pre-
sided over by a member of the Illinois 
Prisoner Review Board who would re-
ceive our testimony and evidence.  The 
ASA spoke to the member of the prisoner 
review board and retold the story of how 
PO Stallworth was murdered and his 
partner PO Ervin was shot on the night of 
24 May 1967 while conducting a routine 
traffic stop for no other reason that they 
were doing their duty serving and pro-
tecting the citizens of the city of Chicago 
and how this coward only surrendered 
after he ran out of bullets in the handgun 
which he fired at responding police offi-
cers.  The letters from the surviving 
widow and partner were also read and 
detailed how their lives had been im-
pacted, changed forever by this violent 
act and that this murderer should not be 
released. We the representatives in atten-
dance then all read our objections into 
the record asking that the Parole Board 
not release this convicted murderer be-
fore he complete his lawful sentence.  
The En Banc Hearing in this case as well 
as 2 other cases involving the convicted 
murderers of Chicago Police Officers 
will be heard at the State Capitol in 
Springfield, Illinois on 19 November 
2009.  We must remind those who are 
responsible for ensuring that these dan-
gerous individuals never return to soci-
ety. 
     We will travel by bus with other po-
lice officers and supporters to make our 
presence known and object to any possi-
bility of parole for these convicted cop 
killers before their lawfully imposed sen-
tenced is completed. 
ceive the 6% pay increase that the Mayor 
and Alderman voted for themselves.  The 
Alderman voted to increase their expense 
accounts as well as their aldermanic dis-
cretionary fund.  Yet here we sit without 
a contract. 
     We are thrown under the bus every 
time it is politically expedient by the 
Mayor and by some of the Aldermen.  
We are driving vehicles that are unsafe 
because those are the only vehicles we 
have. 
     When was the last time an Alderman 
was sued for doing their job and forced to 
pay punitive damages?  When was the 
last time a politician chased a man with a 
gun around a dark corner or put their life 
on the line for the citizens of Chicago?  
When was the last time an Alderman 
sacrificed his life for the citizens of Chi-
Skin In The Game 
     The Mayor has an-
nounced the expansion 
of unpaid furlough days 
to help solve the City’s 
financial crisis, which 
brings the total unpaid 
furlough days for City 
Employees to 24 plus unpaid holidays.  
The media interviewed Alderman Ed 
Smith who complained that Police and 
Fire are not taking any unpaid furlough 
days and that, “they need to get some skin 
in the game.”  Is he kidding?  If we are 
forced to sacrifice any more “skin” Chi-
cago Police Officers will become the 
thinnest blue line in the nation. 
     I cannot speak for Fire, but I can say 
that we have been working without a con-
tract since June of 2007.  We did not re-
cago?  Does Alderman Ed Smith even 
care that the City plans to hire only a 
minimal number of officers next year, or 
perhaps none at all?  Does Alderman Ed 
Smith have any concept of what it is like 
to work a one man car?  Does Alderman 
Ed Smith care (or even know) that we are 
short approximately 591 officers?  Every 
day we are asked to do more with less, 
which puts our lives in even greater jeop-
ardy.  Despite all that, we continue to 
proudly serve. 
     I think it is clear who has “skin in the 
game” and it isn’t you, Mr. Smith.  It is 
the “skin” of 11,500 dedicated men and 
women who continue to provide Chica-
goans professional and selfless service 
day in and day out. 
It’s Just a Witness 
Report Officer 
     The Lodge must re-
ceive at least 50 calls a 
month from our Members 
telling us that they were 
notified by either IAD or 
IPRA because they are being required to 
submit either a formal statement or a 
written report and that they are not ac-
cused but only a witness.  The first com-
ment from these officers sometimes will 
be that I am just letting the Lodge know 
but I don’t think I need a lawyer, because 
I am only a witness regarding a CR in-
vestigation.  The best advice I can always 
give to these Officers is that you are enti-
tled to representation pursuant to Section 
6.2 of our Contract which describes and 
details how the Department or IPRA will 
conduct Witness Statements involving 
our members whether written or oral.  
The affected Officer upon being notified 
by a supervisor or on Department com-
puter that they are a witness in a CR in-
vestigation have the right to request to 
secure legal counsel.  The Lodge strongly 
recommends that any time you must re-
spond to this type of notification you 
contact the Lodge and we will provide an 
attorney to assist and represent you dur-
ing the interview.   Officers in the event 
Third Vice-President’s Report, By Greg Bella 
Second Vice-President’s Report, By Frank DiMaria 
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Release of CR Files (Kalven Court Decision) 
A recent Appellate Court decision concerning the release of CR files pursuant to 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests as part of Kalven v. the City of Chicago 
& the Chicago Police Department has become a major concern to the Membership; 
and rightfully so. When this litigation began back in 2009, the Lodge did not formally 
join the City or the Department in this legal challenge, thus leaving the City and the 
Department to challenge the FOIA requests to release CRs and RLs (Repeater Lists) on their own. 
Now, after the decision has been heard and appealed, the Lodge has no legal standing or litigant 
position to file any additional actions. 
 So what does this mean to the Membership? In compliance with the court decision, lists 
of past complaints against Chicago Police Officers will now be released to the public for review. 
We initially spoke about this case at our first General Meeting in April and mentioned then that 
this decision would wind up being something that every working officer would have an extensive 
interest in. We contacted the Lodge’s attorneys and requested their take on the impact. (Further 
information that details the attorney’s input is available on page six of this Newsletter).  
 
More History 
 In December 2009, (Attorney) Kalven filed suit against the City (and the CPD) under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), to obtain Complaint Register (CR) files as well as Repeater 
Lists (RL).  Initially, the Circuit Court held that Kalven was entitled to the RLs, but not to the 
CRs.  After an appeal, the Court ruled Kalven was entitled to both the RLs and CRs, (subject to 
complainant and witness redaction) .  
 The intention of the Freedom of Information Act (as argued in Kalven), was to allow the 
public to review the actions of public bodies to ensure full disclosure of public employees and 
make them available for review; such as with Chicago Police Officers.  An individual working for 
a private employer would not face this level of scrutiny. As we are all well aware, a CR Investiga-
tion of a Police Officer does not establish any wrongdoing on the part of the Officer; it is a fact 
that most allegations are either Not Sustained, Unfounded or, Exonerated. 
 An additional concern of ours is the impact this type of disclosure might have on the rep-
utation of the individual Police Officers and quite frankly, the Chicago Police Department as 
well.  A Police Officer might suffer undue scrutiny from family members, friends, neighbors and 
even co-workers, when this information is released. Furthermore, an additional risk now exists 
that the public (including some criminal defense attorneys) can start to access this information 
through a Freedom of Information Act request in a much more exaggerated manner.  
 
Lodge Position 
 The Lodge emphatically believes the Court erred in its ruling. Consequently, we believe 
the statute should be amended to exempt both CRs and RLs from public view and production. The 
Lodge sees this decision as unfair prejudice and that such disclosures may have a negative impact 
on individual Police Officers. There also exists a likelihood that such public exposure will dis-
courage many intelligent, skilled and dedicated individuals from continuing, or even beginning a 
career in public service. When is enough, truly enough? 
 
 A Final Update on Kalven v. City 
 Although we cannot alter the Court’s decision concerning the release of the CR and RL 
lists, we might have one option available to possibly challenge some of the names on those lists. 
On 28 July 14, the Lodge filed an Emergency Motion requesting a Temporary Restraining Order 
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Figure A.3: Officer-involved-shooting scandal
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Figure A.4: CPD Areas, Districts and Beats
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Figure A.5: Placebo estimates of the effect of oversight on complaints
Notes: Each placebo estimate first assigns a window around a false event date from April 2013
to January 2014, and then uses an RD to estimate the effect of oversight on complaints. The
placebo estimates are not independent of each other, as the samples overlap. Standard errors are
clustered at the police beat level and we report the 95% confidence interval of each point estimates.
The dotted horizontal grey lines correspond to the 10th and 90th percentiles of the placebos of the
quadratic specification.
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Figure A.6: Placebo estimates of the effect of oversight on crimes
Notes: Each placebo estimate first assigns a window around a false event date from April 2013 to
January 2014, and then uses an RD to estimate the effect of oversight on crimes. The placebo
estimates are not independent of each other, as the samples overlap. Standard errors are clustered
at the police beat level and we report the 95% confidence interval of each point estimates. The
dotted horizontal grey lines correspond to the 10th and 90th percentiles of the placebos of the
quadratic specification.
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Figure A.7: Placebo estimates of the effect of oversight on arrests
Notes: Each placebo estimate first assigns a window around a false event date from April 2013 to
January 2014, and then uses an RD to estimate the effect of oversight on arrests. The placebo
estimates are not independent of each other, as the samples overlap. Standard errors are clustered
at the police beat level and we report the 95% confidence interval of each point estimates. The
dotted horizontal grey lines correspond to the 10th and 90th percentiles of the placebos of the
quadratic specification.
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Table A.3: Complaints response to monitoring-Donut RD dropping month of the event
All All Serious Serious FPS FPS Other Other Unknown Unknown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event -0.030** -0.058** -0.008 -0.050*** -0.012*** -0.003 0.001 0.012 -0.010 -0.017
(0.012) (0.026) (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Mean pre-event 0.259 0.259 0.088 0.088 0.034 0.034 0.040 0.040 0.098 0.098
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event -0.040*** -0.070*** -0.020*** -0.047*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.000 -0.004 -0.014** -0.013
(0.014) (0.019) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011)
Mean pre-event 0.197 0.197 0.063 0.063 0.025 0.025 0.033 0.033 0.076 0.076
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event 0.065*** 0.133*** 0.023*** 0.044*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.006 0.012* 0.028*** 0.064***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Mean pre-event 0.146 0.146 0.043 0.043 0.018 0.018 0.029 0.029 0.055 0.055
No of obs. 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of complaints per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January
2007 to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the
residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are
clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Crimes response to monitoring-Donut RD dropping month of the event
All All Violent Violent Property Property Other Other
Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event 0.457 -0.209 -0.055 -0.046 0.005 0.307 0.508** -0.470
(0.371) (0.696) (0.046) (0.066) (0.160) (0.263) (0.233) (0.460)
Mean pre-event 15.608 15.608 1.285 1.285 4.693 4.693 9.630 9.630
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event -0.082 -0.072 0.033 0.067 -0.148 0.163 0.033 -0.302
(0.278) (0.324) (0.038) (0.062) (0.108) (0.144) (0.214) (0.258)
Mean pre-event 13.056 13.056 1.088 1.088 4.034 4.034 7.933 7.933
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event 1.244*** 1.039*** 0.181*** 0.117* 0.740*** 0.461*** 0.324 0.461*
(0.308) (0.318) (0.038) (0.067) (0.107) (0.138) (0.233) (0.263)
Mean pre-event 11.805 11.805 0.991 0.991 3.456 3.456 7.357 7.357
No of obs. 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of crimes per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January 2007
to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the residuals
of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are clustered at
the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Arrests response to monitoring-Donut RD dropping month of the event
All All Violent Violent Property Property Other Other
Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event 0.949*** -0.512 0.031** -0.014 0.062 0.019 0.856*** -0.517*
(0.172) (0.330) (0.014) (0.024) (0.042) (0.068) (0.151) (0.290)
Mean pre-event 4.607 4.607 0.229 0.229 0.467 0.467 3.911 3.911
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event -0.015 -0.370** 0.005 0.016 -0.018 0.024 -0.003 -0.410**
(0.153) (0.188) (0.013) (0.023) (0.032) (0.042) (0.150) (0.180)
Mean pre-event 3.952 3.952 0.194 0.194 0.381 0.381 3.377 3.377
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event -0.268 0.361* 0.002 0.012 0.021 -0.013 -0.291* 0.361**
(0.164) (0.189) (0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.040) (0.157) (0.178)
Mean pre-event 3.606 3.606 0.182 0.182 0.352 0.352 3.073 3.073
No of obs. 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108 9108
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of arrests per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January 2007
to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the residuals
of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are clustered at
the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Complaints response to monitoring-Donut RD dropping months within 0 and -1
All All Serious Serious FPS FPS Other Other Unknown Unknown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event -0.033*** -0.057** -0.009 -0.051*** -0.014*** -0.003 0.001 0.015 -0.011 -0.017
(0.013) (0.027) (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
Mean pre-event 0.261 0.261 0.088 0.088 0.034 0.034 0.040 0.040 0.099 0.099
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event -0.041*** -0.075*** -0.021*** -0.052*** -0.006 -0.007 -0.000 -0.004 -0.013** -0.012
(0.014) (0.020) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011)
Mean pre-event 0.197 0.197 0.064 0.064 0.025 0.025 0.033 0.033 0.076 0.076
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event 0.069*** 0.145*** 0.023*** 0.045*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.007 0.014** 0.030*** 0.070***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Mean pre-event 0.146 0.146 0.044 0.044 0.018 0.018 0.029 0.029 0.055 0.055
No of obs. 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of complaints per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January
2007 to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the
residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are
clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table A.7: Crimes response to monitoring-Donut RD dropping dropping months within 0 and -1
All All Violent Violent Property Property Other Other
Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event 0.458 0.009 -0.071 -0.057 0.004 0.387 0.524** -0.321
(0.376) (0.703) (0.047) (0.068) (0.163) (0.270) (0.236) (0.462)
Mean pre-event 15.642 15.642 1.288 1.288 4.692 4.692 9.662 9.662
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event -0.086 -0.003 0.038 0.082 -0.159 0.183 0.035 -0.268
(0.280) (0.331) (0.039) (0.063) (0.108) (0.148) (0.217) (0.266)
Mean pre-event 13.048 13.048 1.085 1.085 4.035 4.035 7.928 7.928
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event 1.280*** 1.095*** 0.183*** 0.115* 0.753*** 0.479*** 0.344 0.500*
(0.312) (0.326) (0.038) (0.067) (0.110) (0.141) (0.236) (0.270)
Mean pre-event 11.772 11.772 0.981 0.981 3.443 3.443 7.348 7.348
No of obs. 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of crimes per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January 2007
to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the residuals
of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are clustered at
the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table A.8: Arrests response to monitoring-Donut RD dropping months within 0 and -1
All All Violent Violent Property Property Other Other
Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event 1.012*** -0.469 0.032** -0.014 0.063 0.019 0.916*** -0.474
(0.173) (0.332) (0.014) (0.025) (0.042) (0.069) (0.152) (0.292)
Mean pre-event 4.615 4.615 0.230 0.230 0.466 0.466 3.919 3.919
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event 0.003 -0.334* 0.005 0.015 -0.019 0.020 0.017 -0.369*
(0.157) (0.198) (0.013) (0.023) (0.032) (0.043) (0.155) (0.191)
Mean pre-event 3.947 3.947 0.194 0.194 0.380 0.380 3.373 3.373
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event -0.252 0.393** 0.001 0.012 0.020 -0.011 -0.273* 0.392**
(0.166) (0.197) (0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.041) (0.160) (0.185)
Mean pre-event 3.606 3.606 0.182 0.182 0.350 0.350 3.074 3.074
No of obs. 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556 8556
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of arrests per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January 2007
to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the residuals
of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are clustered at
the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table A.9: Complaints response to monitoring-Donut RD dropping months within 0 and -2
All All Serious Serious FPS FPS Other Other Unknown Unknown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event -0.036*** -0.058** -0.009 -0.053*** -0.015*** -0.002 -0.000 0.015 -0.013 -0.019
(0.013) (0.028) (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Mean pre-event 0.263 0.263 0.089 0.089 0.034 0.034 0.041 0.041 0.100 0.100
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event -0.041*** -0.078*** -0.020*** -0.051*** -0.006 -0.008 -0.001 -0.006 -0.014** -0.015
(0.014) (0.021) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011)
Mean pre-event 0.198 0.198 0.064 0.064 0.025 0.025 0.033 0.033 0.076 0.076
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event 0.076*** 0.164*** 0.026*** 0.051*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.007 0.016** 0.032*** 0.078***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
Mean pre-event 0.148 0.148 0.044 0.044 0.018 0.018 0.029 0.029 0.056 0.056
No of obs. 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of complaints per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January
2007 to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the
residuals of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are
clustered at the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table A.10: Crimes response to monitoring-Donut RD dropping months within 0 and -2
All All Violent Violent Property Property Other Other
Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event 0.399 0.120 -0.088* -0.076 -0.004 0.465* 0.492** -0.269
(0.383) (0.715) (0.047) (0.068) (0.165) (0.275) (0.242) (0.470)
Mean pre-event 15.671 15.671 1.288 1.288 4.688 4.688 9.695 9.695
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event -0.104 0.048 0.036 0.083 -0.168 0.216 0.028 -0.251
(0.281) (0.341) (0.039) (0.065) (0.110) (0.153) (0.220) (0.275)
Mean pre-event 13.058 13.058 1.084 1.084 4.046 4.046 7.928 7.928
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event 1.326*** 1.210*** 0.186*** 0.128* 0.776*** 0.523*** 0.363 0.559**
(0.315) (0.334) (0.038) (0.068) (0.112) (0.145) (0.238) (0.276)
Mean pre-event 11.758 11.758 0.973 0.973 3.438 3.438 7.346 7.346
No of obs. 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of crimes per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January 2007
to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the residuals
of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are clustered at
the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Arrests response to monitoring-Donut RD dropping months within 0 and -2
All All Violent Violent Property Property Other Other
Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests Arrests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A, FOP Note
Event 1.047*** -0.495 0.034** -0.011 0.065 0.019 0.948*** -0.502*
(0.175) (0.339) (0.014) (0.025) (0.042) (0.070) (0.155) (0.298)
Mean pre-event 4.625 4.625 0.230 0.230 0.466 0.466 3.929 3.929
Panel B, Kalven Note
Event 0.026 -0.273 0.006 0.019 -0.018 0.023 0.038 -0.316
(0.160) (0.208) (0.013) (0.023) (0.033) (0.045) (0.157) (0.200)
Mean pre-event 3.949 3.949 0.193 0.193 0.381 0.381 3.375 3.375
Panel C, OIS Scandal
Event -0.246 0.391* -0.000 0.009 0.024 -0.002 -0.270* 0.385**
(0.170) (0.207) (0.013) (0.022) (0.025) (0.042) (0.163) (0.194)
Mean pre-event 3.615 3.615 0.180 0.180 0.350 0.350 3.084 3.084
No of obs. 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004 8004
No of beats 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276
Specification Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr. Linear Quadr.
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversights on the the number of arrests per 10,000 residents in Chicago from January 2007
to May 2016 (see Section 2). We account for seasonal patterns in outcomes by removing the month effect and report the residuals
of this regression. We report the mean of the dependent variable at pre-event and RD estimates. Standard errors are clustered at
the police beat level and are reported in parentheses. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table A.12: Effect of monitoring on crime using alternative samples
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
FOP Kalven OIS FOP Kalven OIS FOP Kalven OIS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Violent -8.944 -5.527 10.717 -11.187 -7.052 10.032 -6.816 -7.427 7.317
(15.487) (12.127) (19.575) (10.641) (12.227) (12.404) (7.128) (7.764) (13.176)
Mean Chicagot<t0 98.854 75.806 71.793 98.854 75.806 71.793 98.854 75.806 71.793
Assault -1.949 -3.744 5.802 -3.479 -4.323 6.434 -4.68 -1.57 6.728
(16.12) (9.956) (23.985) (8.264) (10.337) (13.052) (7.144) (10.569) (32.414)
Mean Chicagot<t0 50.206 37.096 38.673 50.206 37.096 38.673 50.206 37.096 38.673
Murder 0.02 0.034 0.671*** 0.004 0.043 0.578*** 0.016 0.105 0.664***
(0.222) (0.353) (0.205) (0.191) (0.342) (0.162) (0.153) (0.201) (0.222)
Mean Chicagot<t0 1.397 1.353 1.341 1.397 1.353 1.341 1.397 1.353 1.341
Robbery -1.876 -6.645** 8.83*** -1.576 -8.63** 7.899*** -0.807 -3.74 10.408***
(3.067) (3.248) (2.602) (3.239) (2.989) (2.015) (3.204) (2.189) (3.479)
Mean Chicagot<t0 47.251 37.358 31.779 47.251 37.358 31.779 47.251 37.358 31.779
Property 15.582 -3.346 28.26 13.357 0.273 20.94 23.646 0.234 25.452
(23.246) (26.974) (25.891) (20.448) (28.08) (19.875) (28.036) (23.274) (18.095)
Mean Chicagot<t0 373.701 311.613 269.479 373.701 311.613 269.479 373.701 311.613 269.479
Burglary -0.151 -7.263 3.219 1.16 -5.451 3.658 2.637 -3.485 4.88
(8.486) (8.449) (7.312) (7.997) (7.45) (6.147) (8.146) (5.946) (4.813)
Mean Chicagot<t0 75.79 60.172 46.479 75.79 60.172 46.479 75.79 60.172 46.479
Larceny 25.117 -9.236 14.346 -15.422 -7.664 8.229 8.07 -7.559 12.226
(38.594) (19.001) (16.52) (33.23) (19.348) (16.905) (18.821) (15.237) (15.245)
Mean Chicagot<t0 245.693 208.228 189.426 245.693 208.228 189.426 245.693 208.228 189.426
Motor Vehicle Theft 15.607** -13.85 0.972 12.865** -7.637 0.136 12.941* 3.762 5.341
(7.222) (10.657) (10.847) (5.966) (5.59) (11.367) (6.826) (16.523) (6.235)
Mean Chicagot<t0 52.219 43.213 33.574 52.219 43.213 33.574 52.219 43.213 33.574
No. of Cities 68 68 68 56 56 56 33 33 33
No. of Observation 3264 3264 3264 2688 2688 2688 1584 1584 1584
Population   500,00 No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
DOJ Investigated Excluded No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversight on crimes per 100,000 capita (see Section 2). We account for seasonal
patterns in crime outcomes by removing the city-month effect and report the residuals of this regression. Standard
errors for the generalized synthetic controls methods (GSC) are based on parametric bootstraps (blocked at the agency
level ) of 10,000 times. *p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01.
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Table A.13: Effect of monitoring on crime using Synthetic Control Method
Violent Assault Murder Robbery Property Burglary Larceny Auto Theft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A, FOP Note
ATT -11.386 -4.457 0.183 5.421 31.658 2.664 2.304 15.518
5th percentile -11.382 -14.794 -0.205 -4.893 -61.398 -14.358 -22.126 -5.297
95th percentile 13.796 15.096 0.375 4.733 68.042 19.059 62.075 10.337
p-value 0.458 0.833 0.250 0.083 0.333 0.875 0.875 0.042
Panel B, Kalven Note
ATT -8.705 -3.261 0.061 -7.323 -7.915 -6.757 -10.058 -5.733
5th percentile -12.689 -14.120 -0.200 -3.847 -32.141 -10.344 -25.330 -6.730
95th percentile 23.465 25.668 0.335 3.913 71.624 10.528 43.022 11.009
p-value 0.667 0.792 0.375 0.083 0.833 0.542 0.875 0.375
Panel C, OIS Scandal
ATT 11.545 2.316 0.500 6.603 18.968 5.657 9.910 1.671
5th percentile -12.754 -14.661 -0.285 -3.971 -18.370 -8.901 -16.435 -6.034
95th percentile 27.805 25.816 0.488 4.102 35.471 6.878 32.296 16.195
p-value 0.250 0.708 0.083 0.083 0.417 0.625 0.583 0.750
No. of Cities 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
No. of Observation 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200
Notes: This Table presents the effect of oversight on crimes per 100,000 capita (see Section 2) using synthetic control
methods. We account for seasonal patterns in crime outcomes by removing the month effect and use the residuals
of this regression as the outcome. We conduct a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis of no effect in our treatment
by comparing the observed estimate for Chicago to the empirical distribution of the placebo estimates. We report the
5th-95th percentile of the placebo estimates.
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